John Zaller’s “The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion” is a fantastic addition to the literature on public opinion and the science of examining the motives for people’s views on public policy. When reading Zaller’s book, it’s easy to get tunnel vision and subscribe entirely to his views. While his calculations do provide great evidence for his model (although he does use some rather elaborate statistical gymnastics), his model should nonetheless be taken with a grain of salt since other research provides evidence for other factors at play in public opinion formation.
Zaller makes a couple of overarching points. First off, he re-affirms that communications from elites do have an impact on public opinion. This finding further distances audience studies away from Lazarsfeld’s two-step opinion flow model, a trend that started in the 60s. But, he also found that political awareness determined the impact of elite communication. In effect, more politically aware people tended to get their cues from partisan political elites than people who are basically inattentive.
Secondly, Zaller challenges the basic assumption that voters actually have true preferences on public policies. He presents a model in which individuals have conflicting views on specific issues and “winning” opinion really has more to do with what’s on your mind when being interviewed by a pollster. This revelation should create a pause for students of mass political opinion. Many other models do contain a biased assumption – that everyone thinks about politics as much as the average communications researcher. Zaller’s brings points out what should be the starting point for most public opinion research: Most people just don’t care that much about public policy.
Zaller creates the “Receive-Accept-Sample” model and then tests it using public opinion data from the Vietnam War. The model is broken down into four parts.
The Reception Axiom (A1) posits that “the greater a person’s level of cognitive engagement with an issue, the more likely he or she is to be exposed to and comprehend – in a word, to receive – political messages concerning that issue” (p. 42). In other words, more politically aware individuals will receive political communication better. Zaller notes that the axiom “indicates nothing about the sources of the political communications that shape mass opinion” (42). He therefore avoids directly examining some interesting questions about the role of selective exposure and personal deliberation on public opinion. But, the model still works since all he’s saying is that more attentive people receive communication better – regardless of the source.
The Resistance Axiom (A2) notes that “people tend to resist arguments that are incompatible with their political predispositions, but they do so only to the extent that they possess contextual information necessary to perceive a relationship between the message and their predispositions.” So, prior dispositions have a huge impact on whether new information actually produces a change in opinion. But people without prior dispositions (i.e., the uninformed) will tend uncritically accept any political communication. Zaller backs up this model with “a large body of theory and research concerning political persuasion” (p. 45). His thinking lines up with Converse (1964) who found that informed consumers of political communication tend to “constrain” their views depending on the cues of political elites.
The Accessibility Axiom (A3) states that “the more recently a consideration has been called to mind or thought about, the less time it takes to retrieve that consideration or related considerations from memory and bring them to the top of the head for use” (p. 48). In other words, the mind is like a bucket – what’s on top usually comes out first. So, this axiom also sends shivers down the hopeful students of political communication. Surely, we’re more complex than that? But, Zaller backs up this axiom with a wide body of psychological literature.
The Response Axiom (A4) finds that “individuals answer survey questions by averaging across the considerations that are immediately salient or accessible to them.” This axiom augments A3 in that things on the top of one’s head are probably the one’s that will affect an individual’s decision-making process. The axiom allows “different people to respond to issue questions on the basis of different considerations – one, for example, emphasizing ideological concerns, another gut-level likes and dislikes, and yet another self-interest” (p. 49). In this sense, Zaller’s model is far more nuanced than standard S-R models, which assume that everyone reacts to messages in the same way. (An interesting test of A3 and A4 would be to ask about views on euthanasia and correlating for viewing the film “Million Dollar Baby.” Would views change based on how recently they’ve seen the film?)
After explaining his model, Zaller uses the rest of the book to support it with statistical evidence. In Chapter 6, he finds that when elite discourse favors as given public policy in a one-sided manner, it produces a “mainstream pattern.” The most aware members of the public then subscribe to the consensus most strongly. When elite discourse divides along partisan lines, a polarization of the public inevitably follows. In Chapters 7 and 8, Zaller shows that changes in the relative intensity of opposing messages can also affect attitude change (with more intense messages having greater affect.)
I’ll focus the remainder of this paper on Chapter 9, “Two-sided information flows,” because I see some interesting parallels to both our research on global warming attitudes and the credibility of anonymous sources. In this chapter, Zaller examines how “public opinion can be understood as a response to the relative intensity and stability of opposing flows of liberal and conservative communications” (p. 186).
Zaller uses attitudes toward the Vietnam War as a foil to test his model. He picked the subject because of available data and the war’s shift in public support. In order gauge the coverage of the war, Zaller instructed a research assistant to undergo a content analysis of newspapers and newsmagazines of the era. He had the RA code each article as either “prowar” or “antiwar.” As a veteran content analyzer , I must take umbrage with his methods. Zaller doesn’t mention intercoder reliability, probably because he never tested for it – and I doubt it would have been extremely high. Such a rough estimation sounds more like a guess that an analysis. However, the rough analysis probably gauged the rough outline of Vietnam War coverage over the years acceptably. So, perhaps I shouldn’t quibble. But, it appears we often draw the line on rigorous research methods at different places. On another note, Zaller’s method to obtain a hawk-dove data set is brilliant. (He took data from 1988 survey that asked the question, then applied the results to the 1966 data using attitudes and opinions as an interloper.)
Zaller discovered that the pro- and anti-war message became more intense between 1964 and 1966. Initially, the pro-war message was more intense than the anti-war message, but that advantage disappeared by 1970. The RAS model predicts that the attitude of politically attuned liberals would shift first between 1964 and 1966 because they would be the only one paying attention to the anti-war messages. He found exactly that. Zaller summarizes: “Public attitudes on major issues change in response to changes in the relative intensities of competing streams of political communications, as filtered through the reception-acceptance process” (p. 190). He then goes on to show – via complicated statistical models – that people respond to survey questions on the basis of “whatever considerations are present in their minds and immediately accessible memory” (p. 190). In essence, he finds that message intensity affects people who are inattentive, supporting that part of the RAS model. Some of his data analysis didn’t produce statistical precision. He explains this away with various reasons, but I found myself again wondering about the moving yardstick of research methodology.
After reviewing his statistical results, Zaller sums up by arguing that his theory improves upon Converse in one way. Converse argues that ideology operates as a “constraint.” Zaller points out that if liberals were truly constrained by ideology, then they would’ve remained in support of the war – “as another case of post-World War II liberal internationalism” (p. 209). Since liberals changed their views on the war, Zaller concludes that they must’ve looked toward elite cues, rather than rely upon ideological constraints. The Vietnam War is a rare opportunity, he concludes, to watch a shift in the evolution of mass ideologies.
Exposure to global warming is probably equally restrained by ideology. Perhaps the conservatives holding out skepticism are listening more attentively to the anti-global warming message in a similar fashion. But, unlike the Vietnam War study, the mainstream sources are almost completely ignoring the skeptical elites. So, where are they getting their political communication? Somebody ought to do a study…
Showing posts with label public opinion. Show all posts
Showing posts with label public opinion. Show all posts
Tuesday, February 3, 2009
"Public Opinion" -- Glynn, Herbst, O’Keefe, and Shapiro
Chapter Four of “Public Opinion” by Glynn, Herbst, O’Keefe, and Shapiro offers a great summation of psychological perspectives on the formation of public opinion. The chapter helpfully starts with an overview of the common definitions, including an explanation of the terms “beliefs,” “values,” “attitudes,” and “opinions.”
Beliefs, we are told, are the “cognitive components that make up our understanding of the way things are, that is, the information that individuals have about objects or actions.” They are the building blocks of opinions and attitudes. Often they are widely shared by an entire culture, so beliefs are tough to identify. For instance, Western culture embraces the belief that people are perfectible, that they can improve over time. Individuals in this culture, therefore, find it hard to understand the Indian caste system, in which members cannot rise above their current social status. When shaping public opinion, beliefs must be categorized as the most difficult attribute to influence. Even as an “objective academic,” I struggle to retain neutrality with certain beliefs. For instance, I believe strongly that free speech should always be favored in any battle against speech restriction. While I can defend that belief with evidence (e.g., marketplace of ideas, Milton’s “Areopagitica”) others can defend their opposing beliefs just as easily (e.g., harmony of the state, Hobbes’ “Leviathan.”) Beliefs are simply a representation of that which we assume to be true – a faith, for lack of a better word. Another trait of beliefs (not in the reading) is that people seldom admit that their beliefs are actually beliefs. Instead, they’ll argue that their beliefs are facts – the only possible interpretation of the evidence as laid out. By the way, many academic theorists – while professing to be full of free-thinking, evidence-based argumentation – suffer the worst from the assumption that they’ve found Truth by examining all the facts. Of course, that’s just my belief. (As another aside, I don’t think there’s a difference between a belief and “faith” – although the latter is often a dirty word.)
The authors go on to talk about values, described as representations “of the way things should be.” Values, then, are the goals one strives to obtain in whatever belief-system one operates. The authors then differentiate between two types of values. Terminal values are goals we want to reach (e.g., freedom, equality, peace.) Instrumental values are the means we endorse to reach our goals (e.g., honesty, responsibility, and loyalty.) Values are often, like beliefs, taken for granted.
Attitudes, we are told, “are general and enduring positive or negative feelings about some person, object or issue.” Attitudes have three components: cognitions (or beliefs), affect (or feelings) and behavior. The authors note that attitudes differ from beliefs because they have a strong emotional component. Of course, beliefs carry strong emotional components as well – try explain to a libertarian why rent-control is such a good idea. Indeed, finding the difference between beliefs and attitudes seems fraught with difficulty. The book explains that beliefs are evaluative in nature, but that you “perceive these evaluations as inherent characteristics of the objects of your beliefs.” But, attitudes reflect personal likes and dislikes, “you recognize them as your own orientation toward objects rather than as characteristics that are somehow part of the objects themselves.” Ahh! This makes sense. As I said earlier, beliefs tend to be viewed internally as incontrovertible conclusions brought out by an honest assessment of the facts. But, attitudes people are more likely to understand as simply “their way of looking at things.” This distinction would seem to be an incredibly important point for anyone interested in swaying public opinion. Since attitudes are cognitively conceived as a “personal preference,” they should be more malleable than beliefs, which are representations of Truth. Anyone interested in swaying public opinion, therefore, should first frame the issue as a matter of attitude, not a belief. In fact, views toward homosexuality (at least in the United States) have followed this model. Forty years ago most people shared the belief that homosexuality was wrong. Over the years, people’s feelings about the issue (well, at least some people’s) have softened with most just holding a residual attitude about it – nothing as solid as a belief. Many other social issues have followed a similar path (e.g., civil rights, smoking, corporal punishment, etc.)
That leaves us with opinions. The authors define these as the expression of an attitude “either verbally or through behavior.” The distinction between attitudes and opinions is that attitudes may never be expressed as opinions – “they are deeper inside a person than opinions are.” Attitudes are unwavering, but opinions can change along with circumstances. I love chocolate, but I may hate it after eating too much chocolate cake. Often attitudes and opinions jibe, but sometimes they do not. The book notes some people may believe members of Congress are disreputable but put a lot of faith in their own lawmaker. This tendency is an interesting example and one that I discovered in my lit review of media credibility. Many respondents distrusted the media in general, but gave high marks to their preferred media outlet.
The authors then discuss theories surrounding attitude formation. The earliest research found evidence of conditioning. In classical conditioning, people formed attitudes or beliefs, much like animals, based on cues from their surroundings. In operant conditioning, people act to maximize the positive and minimize the negative consequences of their behavior. For instance, a researcher found he could shape vocal patterns by merely offering positive or negative cues. Although later problems with the behavioral approach have arisen, the authors stress its most important contribution: That people do not think very much about the opinions they express. Probably the understatement of the year.
The authors do list at least five problems with the behavioral approach. The model doesn’t account for why some opinions are more thought-out than others. The model doesn’t account for a “package” of attitudes and opinions, and its impact on belief formation. The model doesn’t take into account that two people may hold the same belief for two different reasons. (Polls of Obama voters should support this tendency well.) Behavioral theories can’t explain why people don’t always act in concordance with their attitudes. Also, they don’t factor in emotions, which play an important role in formulation of public opinion.
So, what theories work better? Well, we have a bunch of choices. Consistency theories basically focus on the differences between different viewpoints (i.e., attitudes, opinions beliefs, etc.) These theories include balance theory (people want to create a balance in their thinking), congruity theory (weighing things with shades of gray) and cognitive dissonance theory (people tune out information that don’t correspond to their own beliefs.)
Judgmental theories argue that “our past experiences play an important role in the ways that we interpret new information.” These theories go beyond the simple Stimulus-Response models and look for more interactions that influence opinion formation. These include social judgment theory and adaption theory which both hold that individual situations play a part in shaping one’s views.
The cognitive mediation theory that we’re using in our global warming paper fits into the judgmental theory category. Grounded in the O-S-O-R model, it looks at Stimulus (S) and Response (R), but also examines those two O’s. The first is structural, cultural, cognitive and motivational characteristics of the audience (i.e., individual baggage). The second O exams what is likely to happen between the reception of the message and the response of the audience member. The cognitive model suggests that motivations do not have a direct role on media effects. Rather, the model predicts that motivations activate information processing behaviors that then lead to cognitive media effects. In sum, “the cognitive mediating model argues that information processing mediates the influence of gratifications sought on media effects.” If I understand that correctly, the authors are stating that prior attitudes will merely influence how we think about new information presented to us – not directly affect our decisions.
Beliefs, we are told, are the “cognitive components that make up our understanding of the way things are, that is, the information that individuals have about objects or actions.” They are the building blocks of opinions and attitudes. Often they are widely shared by an entire culture, so beliefs are tough to identify. For instance, Western culture embraces the belief that people are perfectible, that they can improve over time. Individuals in this culture, therefore, find it hard to understand the Indian caste system, in which members cannot rise above their current social status. When shaping public opinion, beliefs must be categorized as the most difficult attribute to influence. Even as an “objective academic,” I struggle to retain neutrality with certain beliefs. For instance, I believe strongly that free speech should always be favored in any battle against speech restriction. While I can defend that belief with evidence (e.g., marketplace of ideas, Milton’s “Areopagitica”) others can defend their opposing beliefs just as easily (e.g., harmony of the state, Hobbes’ “Leviathan.”) Beliefs are simply a representation of that which we assume to be true – a faith, for lack of a better word. Another trait of beliefs (not in the reading) is that people seldom admit that their beliefs are actually beliefs. Instead, they’ll argue that their beliefs are facts – the only possible interpretation of the evidence as laid out. By the way, many academic theorists – while professing to be full of free-thinking, evidence-based argumentation – suffer the worst from the assumption that they’ve found Truth by examining all the facts. Of course, that’s just my belief. (As another aside, I don’t think there’s a difference between a belief and “faith” – although the latter is often a dirty word.)
The authors go on to talk about values, described as representations “of the way things should be.” Values, then, are the goals one strives to obtain in whatever belief-system one operates. The authors then differentiate between two types of values. Terminal values are goals we want to reach (e.g., freedom, equality, peace.) Instrumental values are the means we endorse to reach our goals (e.g., honesty, responsibility, and loyalty.) Values are often, like beliefs, taken for granted.
Attitudes, we are told, “are general and enduring positive or negative feelings about some person, object or issue.” Attitudes have three components: cognitions (or beliefs), affect (or feelings) and behavior. The authors note that attitudes differ from beliefs because they have a strong emotional component. Of course, beliefs carry strong emotional components as well – try explain to a libertarian why rent-control is such a good idea. Indeed, finding the difference between beliefs and attitudes seems fraught with difficulty. The book explains that beliefs are evaluative in nature, but that you “perceive these evaluations as inherent characteristics of the objects of your beliefs.” But, attitudes reflect personal likes and dislikes, “you recognize them as your own orientation toward objects rather than as characteristics that are somehow part of the objects themselves.” Ahh! This makes sense. As I said earlier, beliefs tend to be viewed internally as incontrovertible conclusions brought out by an honest assessment of the facts. But, attitudes people are more likely to understand as simply “their way of looking at things.” This distinction would seem to be an incredibly important point for anyone interested in swaying public opinion. Since attitudes are cognitively conceived as a “personal preference,” they should be more malleable than beliefs, which are representations of Truth. Anyone interested in swaying public opinion, therefore, should first frame the issue as a matter of attitude, not a belief. In fact, views toward homosexuality (at least in the United States) have followed this model. Forty years ago most people shared the belief that homosexuality was wrong. Over the years, people’s feelings about the issue (well, at least some people’s) have softened with most just holding a residual attitude about it – nothing as solid as a belief. Many other social issues have followed a similar path (e.g., civil rights, smoking, corporal punishment, etc.)
That leaves us with opinions. The authors define these as the expression of an attitude “either verbally or through behavior.” The distinction between attitudes and opinions is that attitudes may never be expressed as opinions – “they are deeper inside a person than opinions are.” Attitudes are unwavering, but opinions can change along with circumstances. I love chocolate, but I may hate it after eating too much chocolate cake. Often attitudes and opinions jibe, but sometimes they do not. The book notes some people may believe members of Congress are disreputable but put a lot of faith in their own lawmaker. This tendency is an interesting example and one that I discovered in my lit review of media credibility. Many respondents distrusted the media in general, but gave high marks to their preferred media outlet.
The authors then discuss theories surrounding attitude formation. The earliest research found evidence of conditioning. In classical conditioning, people formed attitudes or beliefs, much like animals, based on cues from their surroundings. In operant conditioning, people act to maximize the positive and minimize the negative consequences of their behavior. For instance, a researcher found he could shape vocal patterns by merely offering positive or negative cues. Although later problems with the behavioral approach have arisen, the authors stress its most important contribution: That people do not think very much about the opinions they express. Probably the understatement of the year.
The authors do list at least five problems with the behavioral approach. The model doesn’t account for why some opinions are more thought-out than others. The model doesn’t account for a “package” of attitudes and opinions, and its impact on belief formation. The model doesn’t take into account that two people may hold the same belief for two different reasons. (Polls of Obama voters should support this tendency well.) Behavioral theories can’t explain why people don’t always act in concordance with their attitudes. Also, they don’t factor in emotions, which play an important role in formulation of public opinion.
So, what theories work better? Well, we have a bunch of choices. Consistency theories basically focus on the differences between different viewpoints (i.e., attitudes, opinions beliefs, etc.) These theories include balance theory (people want to create a balance in their thinking), congruity theory (weighing things with shades of gray) and cognitive dissonance theory (people tune out information that don’t correspond to their own beliefs.)
Judgmental theories argue that “our past experiences play an important role in the ways that we interpret new information.” These theories go beyond the simple Stimulus-Response models and look for more interactions that influence opinion formation. These include social judgment theory and adaption theory which both hold that individual situations play a part in shaping one’s views.
The cognitive mediation theory that we’re using in our global warming paper fits into the judgmental theory category. Grounded in the O-S-O-R model, it looks at Stimulus (S) and Response (R), but also examines those two O’s. The first is structural, cultural, cognitive and motivational characteristics of the audience (i.e., individual baggage). The second O exams what is likely to happen between the reception of the message and the response of the audience member. The cognitive model suggests that motivations do not have a direct role on media effects. Rather, the model predicts that motivations activate information processing behaviors that then lead to cognitive media effects. In sum, “the cognitive mediating model argues that information processing mediates the influence of gratifications sought on media effects.” If I understand that correctly, the authors are stating that prior attitudes will merely influence how we think about new information presented to us – not directly affect our decisions.
Wednesday, October 22, 2008
"Manipulating Public Opinion" -- Edward Bernays
Henry: "Dear Kate, you and I cannot be confined within the weak list of a country's fashion: we are the makers of manners, Kate."
-- Henry V, Act V, Scene II
In "Manipulating Public Opinion," Bernays makes an eloquent case for public relations. He writes: "This is an age of mass production. In the mass production of materials a broad technique has been developed and applied to their distribution. In this age, too, there must be a technique for the mass distribution of ideas" (p. 971). He notes that before mass communication, public opinion was shaped by other outlets -- tribal chiefs, kinds, and religious leaders (p. 959). When viewed through this lens, the art of manipulating public opinion can be viewed as democratic, since anyone (who can sway the press) can now work to change public sentiment. Bernays also argues that propaganda (public relations by its original moniker) and education are very similar. The former is more overtly partisan while the latter proclaims objectivity -- "attempts to be disinterested" (p. 959). An objective observation shows that education is often propaganda as well -- indeed, schoolbooks are still the most influential form of mass communication.
Bernays insists that manipulating public opinion is actually teaching the public to "ask for what it really wants" and thereby teaching "the public how to safeguard itself against his own possible tyrannous aggressiveness" (p. 960). So, Bernays says we're not manipulating opinion, we're just helping people identify their true beliefs. The notion requires a rather large suspension of disbelief. Bernays argues that somehow making people adopt a position is somehow helping them exercise their own free will. One wonders if Bernays truly believed what he was saying. Of course, Bernays would hope that we not discount this view the public relations is fundamentally good. Perhaps, he's right. After all, public relations campaigns fail all the time. Perhaps because you can't get people to believe something that fundamentally disagrees with their core beliefs. Bernays offers a laundry list of PR success and none of them seem overtly disturbing to core beliefs -- anti-lynching, hat buying, margarine. But, one wonders how Bernays would have responded to the propaganda tactics used by the Nazis. Was hatred for the Jews something that the public really wanted? Perhaps this is the difference between a mass and a public -- a mass can be led astray away from their core beliefs (just like a mob) but a public will remain true to their values.
-- Henry V, Act V, Scene II
In "Manipulating Public Opinion," Bernays makes an eloquent case for public relations. He writes: "This is an age of mass production. In the mass production of materials a broad technique has been developed and applied to their distribution. In this age, too, there must be a technique for the mass distribution of ideas" (p. 971). He notes that before mass communication, public opinion was shaped by other outlets -- tribal chiefs, kinds, and religious leaders (p. 959). When viewed through this lens, the art of manipulating public opinion can be viewed as democratic, since anyone (who can sway the press) can now work to change public sentiment. Bernays also argues that propaganda (public relations by its original moniker) and education are very similar. The former is more overtly partisan while the latter proclaims objectivity -- "attempts to be disinterested" (p. 959). An objective observation shows that education is often propaganda as well -- indeed, schoolbooks are still the most influential form of mass communication.
Bernays insists that manipulating public opinion is actually teaching the public to "ask for what it really wants" and thereby teaching "the public how to safeguard itself against his own possible tyrannous aggressiveness" (p. 960). So, Bernays says we're not manipulating opinion, we're just helping people identify their true beliefs. The notion requires a rather large suspension of disbelief. Bernays argues that somehow making people adopt a position is somehow helping them exercise their own free will. One wonders if Bernays truly believed what he was saying. Of course, Bernays would hope that we not discount this view the public relations is fundamentally good. Perhaps, he's right. After all, public relations campaigns fail all the time. Perhaps because you can't get people to believe something that fundamentally disagrees with their core beliefs. Bernays offers a laundry list of PR success and none of them seem overtly disturbing to core beliefs -- anti-lynching, hat buying, margarine. But, one wonders how Bernays would have responded to the propaganda tactics used by the Nazis. Was hatred for the Jews something that the public really wanted? Perhaps this is the difference between a mass and a public -- a mass can be led astray away from their core beliefs (just like a mob) but a public will remain true to their values.
Is Dewey's Theory of the Public Realizable? No
Dewey holds that public come into existence when things get bad: “Indirect, extensive, enduring and serious consequences of conjoint and interacting behavior call a public into existence having a common interest in controlling these consequences”
p. 126
Dewey makes it clear that obstacles to good public discourse do exist:
Special interests
Powerful corporate capital
Numbing and distracting entertainment
General selfishness
Vagaries of public communication make effective public deliberation difficult.
But, he argues, we can overcome this with good communication:
"Without such communication the public will remain shadowy and formless … Till the Great Society is converted into a Great Community, the Public will remain in eclipse. Communication can alone create a great community." p. 142
According to Alejandro's summation (p. 169), the following conditions for emergence of the public:
1) Dissemination and application of scientific knowledge
2) "Communication of the results of social inquiry," which "is the same thing as the formation of public opinion." (31)
3) The organization of effective and organized inquiry." (32)
4) Record and communication, which "are indispensable to knowledge" (33)
-- Footnotes from Chapter 6 of Hermeneutics, Citizenship, and the Public Sphere, by Roberto Alejandro
Dewey makes the best argument against his public
Given these requirements, Dewey's own points at the beginning of his book work against the creation of a public.
Dewey states that "political facts are not outside human desire and judgment." (p. 6) So, how do we ascertain what facts we should follow?
Dewey argues that "the difference between facts which are what they are independent of human desire and endeavor and facts which are to some extent what they are because of human interest and purpose, and which alter with alteration in the latter, cannot be got rid of by any methodology."
Dewey suggests we "appeal to facts" and pay attention to the "distinction between facts which condition human activity and facts which are conditioned by human activity." If we ignore this difference "social science becomes "psuedo-science."
Well, how do we pay attention to the distinction, when the people paying attention are not "outside human desire and judgment."? In effect, positivism is easily dismissed because nobody can actually agree upon which facts they agree are truthful. And, if the public sphere begins with scientific knowledge and a dissemination of this knowledge, then the realization of the public sphere breaks down right there.
p. 126
Dewey makes it clear that obstacles to good public discourse do exist:
Special interests
Powerful corporate capital
Numbing and distracting entertainment
General selfishness
Vagaries of public communication make effective public deliberation difficult.
But, he argues, we can overcome this with good communication:
"Without such communication the public will remain shadowy and formless … Till the Great Society is converted into a Great Community, the Public will remain in eclipse. Communication can alone create a great community." p. 142
According to Alejandro's summation (p. 169), the following conditions for emergence of the public:
1) Dissemination and application of scientific knowledge
2) "Communication of the results of social inquiry," which "is the same thing as the formation of public opinion." (31)
3) The organization of effective and organized inquiry." (32)
4) Record and communication, which "are indispensable to knowledge" (33)
-- Footnotes from Chapter 6 of Hermeneutics, Citizenship, and the Public Sphere, by Roberto Alejandro
Dewey makes the best argument against his public
Given these requirements, Dewey's own points at the beginning of his book work against the creation of a public.
Dewey states that "political facts are not outside human desire and judgment." (p. 6) So, how do we ascertain what facts we should follow?
Dewey argues that "the difference between facts which are what they are independent of human desire and endeavor and facts which are to some extent what they are because of human interest and purpose, and which alter with alteration in the latter, cannot be got rid of by any methodology."
Dewey suggests we "appeal to facts" and pay attention to the "distinction between facts which condition human activity and facts which are conditioned by human activity." If we ignore this difference "social science becomes "psuedo-science."
Well, how do we pay attention to the distinction, when the people paying attention are not "outside human desire and judgment."? In effect, positivism is easily dismissed because nobody can actually agree upon which facts they agree are truthful. And, if the public sphere begins with scientific knowledge and a dissemination of this knowledge, then the realization of the public sphere breaks down right there.
"Public Opinion" -- Walter Lippman
Lippmann -- Public Opinion
Introduction
Lippman points out the obvious -- that nobody can make decisions based only on things their know empirically -- at some point, everyone must rely upon someone else's (friend, mass media, teacher) communication to make decisions
P. 16:
"This, then, will be the clue to our inquiry. We shall assume that what each man does is based not on direct and certain knowledge, but on pictures made by himself or given to him."
But everybody comes up with their own beliefs in a complicated fashion -- not just by what their told.
p. 17:
"The very fact that men theorize at all is proof that their psuedo-environments, their interior representations of the world, are a determining element in though, feeling and action."
"Public opinion deals with indirect, unseen, and puzzling facts, and there is nothing obvious about them."
So, don't think figuring out why people think what they think is easy -- it's not. Particularly with politics.
Wikipedia's Hermeneutics definition appears appropriate:
"Essentially, hermeneutics involves cultivating the ability to understand things from somebody else's point of view, and to appreciate the cultural and social forces that may have influenced their outlook."
Lippman was a little ahead of his time...
P. 18
"The world that we have to deal with politically is out of reach, out of sight and out of mind." -- so, we have to create our own images.
And it's impossible to create a real image of what's out of sight.
"Chief factors which limit their access to the facts": (p 18)
1) Artificial censorships
2) Limitations of social contact
3) Comparatively meager time available in each day for paying attention to public affairs
4) Distortion from compressing complicated events into shot messages
5) Difficulty in using simple words to express complicated world
6) Fear of facing facts that would threaten established routines
Interesting. But, must the public have access to all these facts to engage in rational-critical debate?
Perhaps a belief, based on previous experience, nullifies the need for specific knowledge of facts.
belief that corporations will always screw over the little guy
belief that free-market works best
belief that we live in a constructed reality
belief that higher taxes hurt job creation
Points out that socialists believe there "exists in the hearts of men a knowledge of the world beyond their reach." (p. 19) Is that true?
States flatly that we must drop the "intolerable and unworkable fiction that each of us must acquire a competent opinion about all public affairs." (p. 19). Is this true?
Yes, but that's not necessarily bad
I don't know anything about insuring a car either -- why must I? Everyone has different interests
NOT ELITISM
Elitism is thinking that you're the only one smart enough to make decisions about public affairs because the public are stupid.
Lipppman isn't saying that (according to my reading)
A more realistic view is that some people just don't care -- doesn't mean they couldn't do a great job if they did care.
We shouldn't confuse "interest in public affairs" with "competence in managing public affairs"
In the Phantom Public, here's a little more elitist: "The socialist scheme has at its root the mystical fallacy of democracy, that the people, all of them, are competent." (1925, p. 38)
But, still, he's just saying that some people don't pay enough attention to make their vote worthwhile. Is this elitism? (No.)
Concludes introduction by saying: "That public opinions must be organized for the press if they are to be sound, not by the press as is the case today."
Makes sense too -- he's just saying that journalists don't necessarily know the right way to look at things either
Obviously, you want to have competing interests shaping their opinions. Otherwise you'd just get propaganda.
Stereotypes
Makes the case that you can't not have stereotypes:
p. 60
"But there are uniformities sufficiently accurate, and the need of economizing attention is so inevitible that the abandonment of all stereotypes for a wholly innocent approach to experience would impoverish human life."
Great point -- right?
We do teach about high-context and low-context cultures in SPCH 1000 -- that's a stereotype.
But he points out that we must be careful: "What matters is the character of the sterotypes, and the gullibility with which we employ them."
How do we do that? Hermeneutics:
Don't assume that the world is "codified according to a code which we possess." Instead, understand the "each man is only a small part of the world, that his intelligence catches at best only phases and aspects of a coarse net of ideas, then, when we use our stereotypes, we tend to know that they are only stereotypes, to hold them lightly, to modify them gladly."
p. 60
Intelligence work
Wow! He predicted the creation of the CIA!
"The [State] Department should be able to call on its own intelligence bureau to assemble the facts in a way suited to the diplomatic problem up for decision. And these facts the diplomatic intelligence bureau would obtain from the central clearing house."
"The central agency would, thus, have in it the makings of a national university."
p. 246
Toward the end, he offers some viewpoints on the masses:
"You cannot take more political wisdom out of human beings than there is in them. And no reform, however sensational, is truly radical, which does not consciously provide a way of overcoming the subjectivism of human opinion based on the limitation of individual experience." P. 249
So, we've really got to make sure people don't just vote on what they think they know -- so, we must make sure we inform them correctly.
So that they do not "elaborate their prejudice instead of increasing their knowledge."
But, who gets to decide what they know?
He never really says, other than deciders must influence the press
I'm not sure he believes one entity must decide.
Marketplace of ideas, and whatnot.
The appeal to the public
States the obvious again:
"The amount of attention available is far too small for any scheme in which it was assumed that all the citizens of the nation would, after devoting themselves to the publications of all the intelligence bureaus, become alert, informed, and eager on the multitude of real questions that never do fit very well into any broad principle. I am not making that assumption." p.250
"The purpose, then, is not to burden every citizen with expert opinions on all questions, but to push that burden away from him towards the responsible administrator."
This is very different from: "The public are stupid"
Lippman understood the dangers of the press controlling the message:
"For the practice of appealing to the public on all sorts of intricate matters means almost always a desire to escape criticism from those who know by enlisting a large majority which has had no chance to know. The verdict is made to depend on who has the loudest or the most entrancing voice, the most skillful or the most brazen publicity man, the best access to the most space in the newspapers. For even when the editor is scrupulously fair to "the other side," fairness is not enough. There may be several other sides, unmentioned by any of the organized, financed and active partisans."
Seems reasonable.
"The private citizen, beset by partisan appeals for the loan of his Public Opinion, will soon see, perhaps, that these appeals are not a compliment to his intelligence, but an imposition on his good nature and an insult to his sense of evidence."
Calls for experts to hash things out:
"That can be done by having the representative inside carry on discussion in the presence of some one, chairman or mediator, who forces the discussion to deal with the analyses supplied by experts. This is the essential organization of any representative body dealing with distant matters. The partisan voices should be there, but the partisans should find themselves confronted with men, not personally involved, who control enough facts and have the dialectical skill to sort out what is real perception from what is stereotype, pattern and elaboration..."
"The value of expert mediation is not that it sets up opinion to coerce the partisans, but that it disintegrates partisanship." p. 253
Expert mediation didn't really settle the case of Bush v. Gore, though.
Conservatives thought it was great; liberals decried it -- no partisanship disintegration
So, Lippman's got a great message up to a point -- but he loses me on the "experts make the decisions" -- are the public to simply let the experts figure out everything and never question anything? Seems untenable.
Agrees with Dewey, says that "education is the supreme remedy, the value of this education will depend upon the evolution of knowledge. And our knowledge of human institutions is still extraordinarily meager and impressionistic."
But, just because we're educated, doesn't mean will can interpret facts correctly.
Suggests teaching critical thought:
"What he can do is to prepare them to deal with that world with a great deal more sophistication about their own minds. He can, by the use of the case method, teach the pupil the habit of examining the sources of his information."
Do we teach this now?
I don't think so; I think we teach that there's one correct way to look at the world.
Introduction
Lippman points out the obvious -- that nobody can make decisions based only on things their know empirically -- at some point, everyone must rely upon someone else's (friend, mass media, teacher) communication to make decisions
P. 16:
"This, then, will be the clue to our inquiry. We shall assume that what each man does is based not on direct and certain knowledge, but on pictures made by himself or given to him."
But everybody comes up with their own beliefs in a complicated fashion -- not just by what their told.
p. 17:
"The very fact that men theorize at all is proof that their psuedo-environments, their interior representations of the world, are a determining element in though, feeling and action."
"Public opinion deals with indirect, unseen, and puzzling facts, and there is nothing obvious about them."
So, don't think figuring out why people think what they think is easy -- it's not. Particularly with politics.
Wikipedia's Hermeneutics definition appears appropriate:
"Essentially, hermeneutics involves cultivating the ability to understand things from somebody else's point of view, and to appreciate the cultural and social forces that may have influenced their outlook."
Lippman was a little ahead of his time...
P. 18
"The world that we have to deal with politically is out of reach, out of sight and out of mind." -- so, we have to create our own images.
And it's impossible to create a real image of what's out of sight.
"Chief factors which limit their access to the facts": (p 18)
1) Artificial censorships
2) Limitations of social contact
3) Comparatively meager time available in each day for paying attention to public affairs
4) Distortion from compressing complicated events into shot messages
5) Difficulty in using simple words to express complicated world
6) Fear of facing facts that would threaten established routines
Interesting. But, must the public have access to all these facts to engage in rational-critical debate?
Perhaps a belief, based on previous experience, nullifies the need for specific knowledge of facts.
belief that corporations will always screw over the little guy
belief that free-market works best
belief that we live in a constructed reality
belief that higher taxes hurt job creation
Points out that socialists believe there "exists in the hearts of men a knowledge of the world beyond their reach." (p. 19) Is that true?
States flatly that we must drop the "intolerable and unworkable fiction that each of us must acquire a competent opinion about all public affairs." (p. 19). Is this true?
Yes, but that's not necessarily bad
I don't know anything about insuring a car either -- why must I? Everyone has different interests
NOT ELITISM
Elitism is thinking that you're the only one smart enough to make decisions about public affairs because the public are stupid.
Lipppman isn't saying that (according to my reading)
A more realistic view is that some people just don't care -- doesn't mean they couldn't do a great job if they did care.
We shouldn't confuse "interest in public affairs" with "competence in managing public affairs"
In the Phantom Public, here's a little more elitist: "The socialist scheme has at its root the mystical fallacy of democracy, that the people, all of them, are competent." (1925, p. 38)
But, still, he's just saying that some people don't pay enough attention to make their vote worthwhile. Is this elitism? (No.)
Concludes introduction by saying: "That public opinions must be organized for the press if they are to be sound, not by the press as is the case today."
Makes sense too -- he's just saying that journalists don't necessarily know the right way to look at things either
Obviously, you want to have competing interests shaping their opinions. Otherwise you'd just get propaganda.
Stereotypes
Makes the case that you can't not have stereotypes:
p. 60
"But there are uniformities sufficiently accurate, and the need of economizing attention is so inevitible that the abandonment of all stereotypes for a wholly innocent approach to experience would impoverish human life."
Great point -- right?
We do teach about high-context and low-context cultures in SPCH 1000 -- that's a stereotype.
But he points out that we must be careful: "What matters is the character of the sterotypes, and the gullibility with which we employ them."
How do we do that? Hermeneutics:
Don't assume that the world is "codified according to a code which we possess." Instead, understand the "each man is only a small part of the world, that his intelligence catches at best only phases and aspects of a coarse net of ideas, then, when we use our stereotypes, we tend to know that they are only stereotypes, to hold them lightly, to modify them gladly."
p. 60
Intelligence work
Wow! He predicted the creation of the CIA!
"The [State] Department should be able to call on its own intelligence bureau to assemble the facts in a way suited to the diplomatic problem up for decision. And these facts the diplomatic intelligence bureau would obtain from the central clearing house."
"The central agency would, thus, have in it the makings of a national university."
p. 246
Toward the end, he offers some viewpoints on the masses:
"You cannot take more political wisdom out of human beings than there is in them. And no reform, however sensational, is truly radical, which does not consciously provide a way of overcoming the subjectivism of human opinion based on the limitation of individual experience." P. 249
So, we've really got to make sure people don't just vote on what they think they know -- so, we must make sure we inform them correctly.
So that they do not "elaborate their prejudice instead of increasing their knowledge."
But, who gets to decide what they know?
He never really says, other than deciders must influence the press
I'm not sure he believes one entity must decide.
Marketplace of ideas, and whatnot.
The appeal to the public
States the obvious again:
"The amount of attention available is far too small for any scheme in which it was assumed that all the citizens of the nation would, after devoting themselves to the publications of all the intelligence bureaus, become alert, informed, and eager on the multitude of real questions that never do fit very well into any broad principle. I am not making that assumption." p.250
"The purpose, then, is not to burden every citizen with expert opinions on all questions, but to push that burden away from him towards the responsible administrator."
This is very different from: "The public are stupid"
Lippman understood the dangers of the press controlling the message:
"For the practice of appealing to the public on all sorts of intricate matters means almost always a desire to escape criticism from those who know by enlisting a large majority which has had no chance to know. The verdict is made to depend on who has the loudest or the most entrancing voice, the most skillful or the most brazen publicity man, the best access to the most space in the newspapers. For even when the editor is scrupulously fair to "the other side," fairness is not enough. There may be several other sides, unmentioned by any of the organized, financed and active partisans."
Seems reasonable.
"The private citizen, beset by partisan appeals for the loan of his Public Opinion, will soon see, perhaps, that these appeals are not a compliment to his intelligence, but an imposition on his good nature and an insult to his sense of evidence."
Calls for experts to hash things out:
"That can be done by having the representative inside carry on discussion in the presence of some one, chairman or mediator, who forces the discussion to deal with the analyses supplied by experts. This is the essential organization of any representative body dealing with distant matters. The partisan voices should be there, but the partisans should find themselves confronted with men, not personally involved, who control enough facts and have the dialectical skill to sort out what is real perception from what is stereotype, pattern and elaboration..."
"The value of expert mediation is not that it sets up opinion to coerce the partisans, but that it disintegrates partisanship." p. 253
Expert mediation didn't really settle the case of Bush v. Gore, though.
Conservatives thought it was great; liberals decried it -- no partisanship disintegration
So, Lippman's got a great message up to a point -- but he loses me on the "experts make the decisions" -- are the public to simply let the experts figure out everything and never question anything? Seems untenable.
Agrees with Dewey, says that "education is the supreme remedy, the value of this education will depend upon the evolution of knowledge. And our knowledge of human institutions is still extraordinarily meager and impressionistic."
But, just because we're educated, doesn't mean will can interpret facts correctly.
Suggests teaching critical thought:
"What he can do is to prepare them to deal with that world with a great deal more sophistication about their own minds. He can, by the use of the case method, teach the pupil the habit of examining the sources of his information."
Do we teach this now?
I don't think so; I think we teach that there's one correct way to look at the world.
Thinking about Mass Publics
What are the theoretical, ethical, aesthetical and political challenges associated with mass publics?
Theoretically -- How exactly does one define a mass public, as opposed to a public? It appears that these authors refer to a mass public as a group that's easily swayed by mass media. Publics -- as conceptualized by previous authors -- are groups that engage in critical-rational debate. Of course, publics must get their information from some source, but if it's not the mass media, then it must be all right. The concept of "mass public" looks a lot like the hypdermic needle theory -- the mass public will believe whatever they're told by the mass media. Of course, this theory breaks down on many levels. Most dismiss it because of the rise of Lazarfeld's limited effects theory, but those theorists have come under fire as well. Perhaps, the real reason publics don't really act as mass publics (swayed at the whim of the mass media) is because publics have so many media choices and other opinion leaders. And, at the end of the day they take what propaganda was fed to them -- from various sources -- and make up their own minds.
Ethically -- Bernays insists that manipulating public opinion is actually teaching the public to "ask for what it really wants" and thereby teaching "the public how to safeguard itself against his own possible tyrannous aggressiveness" (p. 960). So, Bernays says we're not manipulating opinion, we're just helping people identify their true beliefs. The notion requires a rather large suspension of disbelief. Bernays argues that making people adopt a certain position is somehow helping them exercise their own free will -- an interesting ethical position. One wonders if Bernays truly believed what he was saying. Of course, Bernays would hope that we not discount this (manufactured?) view the public relations is fundamentally good. Perhaps, he's right. After all, public relations campaigns fail all the time, perhaps because you can't get people to believe something that fundamentally disagrees with their core beliefs. Bernays offers a laundry list of PR success and none of them seem overtly disturbing to core beliefs -- anti-lynching, hat buying, margarine. But, one wonders how Bernays would have responded to the successful propaganda tactics used by the Nazis. Was hatred for the Jews something that the public really wanted? Perhaps this is the difference between a mass and a public -- a mass can be led astray away from their core beliefs (just like a mob) but a public will remain true to their values.
On another ethical matter, Bernays makes a good point. Media leaders hold a great ability to shape public opinion. But, he points out that public opinion was once shaped by kings, tribal chiefs, and religious leaders. As Henry V said, "Dear Kate, you and I cannot be confined within the weak list of a country's fashion: we are the makers of manners, Kate" (Act V, Scene II.) When viewed through this lens, the art of manipulating public opinion can be viewed as democratic, since anyone (who can sway the press) can now work to change public sentiment. Is this ethically defensible?
Aethetically -- Dewey, Cooley and Park are all quite quite skeptical of new media and their effect on culture. None of them viewed film (the newest media at the time) as a cultural improvement. They may have simply been reflecting their times, many early films weren't adding much to their culture. Obviously, they have grown in stature as a truly independent form of art. All new media offer both a benefit and detriment to society. To embrace or dismiss them (radio, television, Internet, cell phones) wholly doesn't really make sense.
Politically -- Assuming that propaganda works to sway mass publics, we must ask how can governments work to make sure their people are swayed by the correct kind of propaganda. First, an acknowledgment that some propaganda is good. Many mass publics have been swayed by good PR -- e.g., civil rights, smoking, and seat belts. Also, an acknowledgment that public schools are the best forum for propaganda in the world. (Bernays says PR is overtly partisan while education "attempts to be disinterested" (p. 959).) But, how does an elected government determine what propaganda is the one which should sway the masses. For instance, some people blame the U.S. obesity epidemic in part on the USDA and their food pyramid that overstated the need for breads. Also, how can we tell what is fact-based propaganda vs. ideology-based propaganda. Who gets to decide? The IPA was criticized because their efforts at identifying propaganda seemed to contain political bias (p. 163). Only capitalists engage in propaganda, never communists or labor unions. Propaganda's easy to spot -- when the propagandist doesn't belong to your political party.
Interesting question: What do we make of Park and his almost theological bend toward sociology? Czitrom said the he treated it as a religion -- "defining unities and wholeness in the modern world" (p. 120) -- and could have easily gone into the seminary. Park's quote: "We have only to open our eyes to see organization; and if we cannot do that no definition will help us." Hmm.
Theoretically -- How exactly does one define a mass public, as opposed to a public? It appears that these authors refer to a mass public as a group that's easily swayed by mass media. Publics -- as conceptualized by previous authors -- are groups that engage in critical-rational debate. Of course, publics must get their information from some source, but if it's not the mass media, then it must be all right. The concept of "mass public" looks a lot like the hypdermic needle theory -- the mass public will believe whatever they're told by the mass media. Of course, this theory breaks down on many levels. Most dismiss it because of the rise of Lazarfeld's limited effects theory, but those theorists have come under fire as well. Perhaps, the real reason publics don't really act as mass publics (swayed at the whim of the mass media) is because publics have so many media choices and other opinion leaders. And, at the end of the day they take what propaganda was fed to them -- from various sources -- and make up their own minds.
Ethically -- Bernays insists that manipulating public opinion is actually teaching the public to "ask for what it really wants" and thereby teaching "the public how to safeguard itself against his own possible tyrannous aggressiveness" (p. 960). So, Bernays says we're not manipulating opinion, we're just helping people identify their true beliefs. The notion requires a rather large suspension of disbelief. Bernays argues that making people adopt a certain position is somehow helping them exercise their own free will -- an interesting ethical position. One wonders if Bernays truly believed what he was saying. Of course, Bernays would hope that we not discount this (manufactured?) view the public relations is fundamentally good. Perhaps, he's right. After all, public relations campaigns fail all the time, perhaps because you can't get people to believe something that fundamentally disagrees with their core beliefs. Bernays offers a laundry list of PR success and none of them seem overtly disturbing to core beliefs -- anti-lynching, hat buying, margarine. But, one wonders how Bernays would have responded to the successful propaganda tactics used by the Nazis. Was hatred for the Jews something that the public really wanted? Perhaps this is the difference between a mass and a public -- a mass can be led astray away from their core beliefs (just like a mob) but a public will remain true to their values.
On another ethical matter, Bernays makes a good point. Media leaders hold a great ability to shape public opinion. But, he points out that public opinion was once shaped by kings, tribal chiefs, and religious leaders. As Henry V said, "Dear Kate, you and I cannot be confined within the weak list of a country's fashion: we are the makers of manners, Kate" (Act V, Scene II.) When viewed through this lens, the art of manipulating public opinion can be viewed as democratic, since anyone (who can sway the press) can now work to change public sentiment. Is this ethically defensible?
Aethetically -- Dewey, Cooley and Park are all quite quite skeptical of new media and their effect on culture. None of them viewed film (the newest media at the time) as a cultural improvement. They may have simply been reflecting their times, many early films weren't adding much to their culture. Obviously, they have grown in stature as a truly independent form of art. All new media offer both a benefit and detriment to society. To embrace or dismiss them (radio, television, Internet, cell phones) wholly doesn't really make sense.
Politically -- Assuming that propaganda works to sway mass publics, we must ask how can governments work to make sure their people are swayed by the correct kind of propaganda. First, an acknowledgment that some propaganda is good. Many mass publics have been swayed by good PR -- e.g., civil rights, smoking, and seat belts. Also, an acknowledgment that public schools are the best forum for propaganda in the world. (Bernays says PR is overtly partisan while education "attempts to be disinterested" (p. 959).) But, how does an elected government determine what propaganda is the one which should sway the masses. For instance, some people blame the U.S. obesity epidemic in part on the USDA and their food pyramid that overstated the need for breads. Also, how can we tell what is fact-based propaganda vs. ideology-based propaganda. Who gets to decide? The IPA was criticized because their efforts at identifying propaganda seemed to contain political bias (p. 163). Only capitalists engage in propaganda, never communists or labor unions. Propaganda's easy to spot -- when the propagandist doesn't belong to your political party.
Interesting question: What do we make of Park and his almost theological bend toward sociology? Czitrom said the he treated it as a religion -- "defining unities and wholeness in the modern world" (p. 120) -- and could have easily gone into the seminary. Park's quote: "We have only to open our eyes to see organization; and if we cannot do that no definition will help us." Hmm.
"New Communication or Old Propaganda" -- Michael Sproule
Chapter 7 of Sproule's work continues exploring the leftist critique on mass media. Between the 1930s and the 1950s, researchers began studying "communication," rather than "propaganda" (p. 224). Propaganda criticisms seen in the IPA were largely case study, qualitative research. In the 1950s, communication researchers favored quantitative methods. Researchers saw these quantitative studies as more reliable and less likely to contain biases from the researcher. Stouffer spoke of the "white light of a statistical appraisal" (p. 225). Communication researchers went out their way to keep ideology out of the picture, probably in part to the heavily ideological bias of the IPA (p. 227). They noted that propaganda analysis assumed the hyperdermic needle -- "somehow and somewhere, society got moved when the media sopke" (p. 227, 234). Propaganda criticis tended to look at the public as a "mass." By keeping away from the extremes, the new wave of communication researchers didn't run foul with grantors and agencies (p. 230). Despite this less-fervant political agenda, McCarthyism led to great scrutiny of media researchers, large foundations (p. 246). Some groups did combat what was perceived as a McCarthyism-media cabal (p. 252). Media critic Lee ("How to Understand Proganda") emerged but was ignored. He brought back the idea of the public as a "public." Lee said that a "consumer does not need to be highly skilled" to break free of propaganda's hold. With proper analysis people could get back their "town hall spirit" (p. 249). In the 70s, Adorno and the Frankfurt school were introduced widely into U.S. media criticism. Many dismissed Frankfurt ideas for a number of reasons, but the most obvious isn't mentioned: the predicted collapse of capitalism that never materialized. Media criticism evolved into the "social responsibility" model -- where media manufacturers display restraint, and the government doesn't get too involved (p. 255).
"Toward a New Community? Modern Communication in the Social Thought of Charles Horton Cooley, John Dewey, and Robert E. Park" -- Daniel J. Czitrom
Czitrom's chapter covers the life history and evolution of Cooley, Dewey and Park. The chapter notes that the three men "construed modern communication as an agent for restoring a broad moral and political consensus to America" (p. 92) This consensus was needed because of the "wrenching disruptions" caused by urbanization, industrialization and immigration. They hoped that "broadly based public opinion, rooted in the wide diffusion of organized intelligence, could counteract the modern gesellschaft, but feared that the expressive side of the new media would reinforce it." So, if everyone could get educated, and the public would be informed, then they could make intelligent decisions. But, if "express" media like films continued to gain in popularity, then the public sphere would continue its decline. Cooley saw communication as a key to helping people relate to the world -- in an almost metaphysical, we're-all-connected sense. Cooley (p.99) "envisioned a society in which the individual is self-concious and devoted to his work, yet he feels himself and that work, as part of a larger and joyous whole" (a.k.a "organicism.") Dewey enjoyed a grand unified theory as well, hence his attraction to Hegelian philosophy. Dewey: "Hegel's synthesis of subject and object, matter and spirit, the divine and the human, was, however, no mere intellectual formula; it operated as a immense release, a liberation" (p. 103). He hoped that a "Great Community" (of interconnectedness) could be achieved through "free and full communication" (p. 111). After unsuccessful attempts at actually implementing changes into communication system (e.g., "Thought News"), Dewey retreated to a more comfortable identity: "a philosopher of communication, absorbed in the metaphysical complexities of the communicative process" (p. 112). Park also saw communication as a way to create a collective thought. Park argued "that the press must go beyond merely orienting the public to issues, it must "bring into existence a collective will and a political power which, as it mobilizes the community to act, tends to terminate discussion" (p. 118). He saw the press as a mechanism for "controlling collective attention" (p. 115). So, all three men saw these new communication tools as a elements that could "promote unity and a democratically achieved consensus in American public life" (p. 119). But, they all also worred about "expressive" media (e.g., pop culture, like movies and periodicals) which could prove to be the public sphere's undoing. "The darker side of modern communication's potential was in the cultural sphere" (p. 120). What would they say if they watched "America's Got Talent"?
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