Communication Flux Model:
A Media System Theory for the 21st Century
By Matt J. Duffy
(c) 2009
Since the 1950s, theorists have attempted to create a model that explains the world’s various media systems. In 1956, Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm penned “The Four Theories of the Press,” the first attempt to map the media landscape. Since then, the Four Theories of the Press have been praised as accurate and illustrative and ridiculed as biased and incomplete. Many other theorists have contributed their own models to the field with some borrowing on the Four Theories while others scrap the authors’ ideas for totally original approaches.
This paper will add a new voice to debate. The author will first outline some of the major theories of the press: authoritarian, communist, libertarian, social responsibility, developmental and democratic-participant. He will then note how the current theories fail to adequately account for the present day global media system environment. Then, the author will introduce a paradigm for explaining global media systems, the Communication Flux Model.
The authoritarian model outlined by Siebert et al. can be found most often in countries with monarchies. The ruler, who inherits his right to rule from God, is ordained to protect the country and its people. Residents of authoritarian regimes give up some freedoms in exchange for the benefit of living in a stable society. Plato, Machiavelli and Hobbes have all argued in favor of an authoritarian model. The media system in an authoritarian regime exercises complete control over the media systems – either by state ownership of media outlets or censorship over privately owned media. The press is not allowed to criticize the government, lest social order be upset. The media exists only “to disseminate information that only the state deems to be appropriate.” The government ensures a compliant press through state censorship (in which a government staffer approves material before publication or broadcast) or through self-censorship (in which media outlets learn the rules about what type of material is acceptable.) The government may punish outlets that stray too far from acceptability with monetary fines or jail terms.
Under the communist model, egalitarian social harmony is the goal. The government takes the role of societal care-giver, implementing policies that favor the society as a whole rather than individuals. Unlike the authoritarian model, communist regimes derive their power from the people, rather than divine order. Authors whose writings have led to the communist model include Hegel and Marx. The state exercises control of the media through direct ownership and censorship. The state also assumes that capitalistic models of media systems lead to a decline in programming standards. Communist governments hope to benefit society by demanding more out of entertainment than the basest forms of sensational entertainment. Governments with communist models don’t tolerate criticism of official policies and may respond to violators with dismissal from positions or even detention.
The libertarian model is a vast departure from the aforementioned systems which focus on the benefits to society as a whole. Under a libertarian model, the focus rests solely on the individual. The philosophy derives from authors such as Locke, Smith and Mill who argue that society is served best when markets compete and individuals make choices. In a media system operated according to this principle, the media would be privately owned and operated with little interference from the state. Government would enter the marketplace only to ensure maximum competition. The media under this system regulate themselves and the needs of society would be served by their appeal to consumers’ interests. Under this system, the government may punish businesses that engage in unfair competitive practices.
The social responsibility model appears similar to libertarian, but the government has more authority to regulate the media in the interests of society. Under the model the “media should provide fair and balanced information with a goal of effecting change for the better in society.” The model is a late arrival as a media system, developed in the 1940s as a response in the United States to concerns over the growing capitalistic nature of the press. These concerns led to the formation of the Hutchins Commission, a panel that studied the U.S. media system. Their report as well as several other books formed the foundation of the social responsibility model. Under the social responsibility model, the media are given free access to cover the government and act as a watchdog for the “public interest.” In exchange, they are expected to act in a responsible manner, refraining from excessive sensationalism or cynicism in their coverage. Under this model, the media are expected to report factual information with contextual coverage. They should offer balanced opinion and commentary. And, editors and producers should clarify what societal goals they are trying to steer their coverage toward. In order to achieve these media goals, the government may fine or take away the right for certain media outlets to operate. Another way to achieve these goals is through public admonishment.
Developmental theory focuses on media systems in undeveloped nations. The model proposes that media systems in these countries should help the society achieve better social conditions. The governments are expected to “acquire media technology and to deploy it with the purpose of fixing situations that contribute to social hardships.” In order to reach this goal, the concept of media freedom must first be adopted. Often the leaders of developing countries decry press freedom and its obligatory spotlight. But, international pressure would help sway the leadership toward press freedoms under this model. The model derived from the United Nations debates over cultural hegemony in UNESCO in the late 1970s and early 1980s as well as several other authors. Under a developmental model, the government would manage the media to help keep identities intact. Indigenous people would have access to create media content that would help passing along authentic cultural traditions. These productions would be exported to other countries to help make the rest of the world aware of the developing country.
An even newer entrant, the democratic-participant model sees citizen-created media content creating a healthy society and government. Without the citizen input, then media systems will be too heavily favored toward corporate executives or elitist government officials. The model stems from the public journalism movement pioneered by Jay Rosen and Paul Taylor. Under this model, citizens would pressure both the government and the corporations to allow individuals greater access to the media and media-content creating tools. Citizen group would be assured that they could express their opinions without fear of retribution from the government and without having their messages squelched by the media corporations.
The aforementioned models provide a foundation for organizing the media systems theories seen throughout the world. However, problems emerge when applying real-world nations to individual categories.
The latter two “theories” aren’t really theories at all. Few nations actually practice a “democratic-participant” or “developmental” media system. Instead, these theories offer an idealistic state that the authors hope nations will model. Some countries have adopted parts of both models. With the advent of the Internet, blogs and cell phone communications, many cultures have embraced portions of the democratic-participant theory. These technological advances have given citizens much more say in shaping the media in their countries. In the United States, “citizen journalists” can point to specific instances where their points of view have led to changes in the news coverage provoking substantial results (e.g., bloggers drove coverage regarding Senator Trent Lott and television anchor Dan Rather.) But, trying to use these two theories to categorize media systems simply doesn’t work. Nearly all of the world’s media systems don’t operate according to the developmental or democratic-participation model.
The Four Theories works a little a better. Countries do seem to fit broadly into the categories outlined by the authors. But, critics have noted a variety of problems when trying to apply media systems into its categories. First, many critics take umbrage with the model’s apparent bias toward the Western approach to media systems. McKenzie noted that the theory inherently assumed that “government control of media is never desirable whereas freedom from government control was always desirable.” Such a perspective reflects a Western philosophical system in which interests of the individual trumps interests of the society. Other cultures have different philosophical foundations. Grounded in Confucian philosophy, Asian cultures tend to stress the need for social harmony and cohesiveness rather than individual rights.
With the evolution of the media landscape, the Four Theories of the Press looks increasingly out of place. In the 1960s, the media consisted mainly of newspapers, television and radio. For authoritarian or communist regimes, control of those outlets was relatively straightforward. The Communist regimes in China and Russia, for instance, owned all the press outlets and could easily control the media messages. Authoritarian regimes such as Egypt could also control the press without direct ownership through coercive practices. Siebert cites several countries such as Portugal, Ecaudor, Egypt, Pakistan and India that operated in the 1960s under some form of authoritarian control. With all of these examples, times have changed. However, putting many of these countries into easy to pigeonhole categories according to the Four Theories model proves difficult.
China, for instance, still operates with a strong totalitarian bent. The government routinely blocks Web sites from foreign news media, occasionally jails journalists for publishing critical information, and uses the threat of license revocation to coerce favorable coverage. However, as a result of the country’s embrace of capitalism, private ownership of media have flourished and signs of press freedom are emerging. Many observers note that Chinese censorship appears to be haphazard – with some critical comments allowed while others are not tolerated. Chinese journalists and academics have also noted that criticism of the government is tolerated as long as journalists are careful with their words. Given this new reality, trying to put China squarely into the Communist Model simply doesn’t work.
Russia, too, can no longer be easily categorized. After the Soviet empire fell, many expected the nation to fully embrace democracy and the tenets of a free press. The country’s press did gain great freedoms throughout the 90s, but with the entrance of Vladimir Putin as president in 2000, the county has crept toward authoritarian control. Putin has used his power to silence critical voices through license revocation and other forms of coercion. Russia is one of the most dangerous places in the world to be a journalist, with many instances of reporters (especially those critical of the government) being killed and their murders often going unsolved. Still, some freedom of the press exists in the country, particularly on the Internet where critical journalism remains particularly unfettered. So, again, the four theories model doesn’t provide an accurate place to categorize the Russian media system. The Chinese and Russian systems don’t completely fit into the “authoritarian” or “communist” models. While parts of their media systems are tightly controlled by the government, other parts enjoy relative freedom. Several other countries (e.g., Egypt, Pakistan, and Venezuela) similarly defy simple categorization.
Another way in which the traditional theories of the press fail to account for today’s media environment stems from suppression of speech not necessarily caused by the government. For instance, recent criticisms of the Muslim religion have resulted in death threats and riots in several countries. In 2004, Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh was stabbed to death after he created a film that was critical of the Muslim religion. In 2006, a Danish newspaper published cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad prompting worldwide reaction from offended Muslims. Riots broke out in several cities leading to the several deaths. Since these events, some critics have complained that media outlets are engaged in self-censorship, careful not to publish material that may result in death threats or violence. At times various governments – particularly governments in Western cultures with a history of protecting speech – have encouraged this type self-censorship in hopes of not upsetting the social order, labeling criticism of Islam as a form of unprotected hate speech. The media environment surrounding the criticism of Islam escapes traditional categorization as well.
Therefore, a new media system is required. The model will be based upon one overarching variable – freedom. By basing this model on this precept, the author invariably opens himself up to arguments of Western bias. Freedom of thought, expression, and activity has been a central theme of Western cultures since the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215. However, most other cultures also understand the concept of individual freedom, although they may value other factors above it. Despite how each individual culture perceives the value of freedom, all global media systems can in some way be measured – or differentiated – by the amount of freedom held by individuals and journalists to publish or say what they want without fear of encroachment. Freedom should therefore be a main focus of this new model. But, this model must account for the different ways and intensity in which freedom is encroached.
This system should acknowledge that today’s media environments cannot fit into pre-existing categorizations. Because of technological advances, governments can no longer fully control their messages. Some governments (Egypt, China) are experimenting with greater freedom for their media and citizens. Other governments are moving away from media freedom (e.g., Russia.) Also, this model must recognize that some encroachment of freedom derives from non-government sources. The model will address the lack of freedom caused by violence associated with criticism of Islam as well the role of corporate control of media outlets that limits the diversity of ideas in a media system. The model will not ignore the role of self-censorship.
The Communication Flux Model offers a complete overview of all the global media systems. The word flux – used mostly in mathematics and science – refers to the amount of matter that flows through a unit area over a period of time. In this model, flux will refer to the amount of free information that flows unimpeded – for any reasons – through media outlets on a daily basis. As a metaphor for the Communication Flux Model, imagine a flap valve on a water pipe. By turning the handle, the valve opens completely. However, if the handle is turned further, the valve recloses in the other direction. Therefore, to achieve maximum flux, the valve must be turned only so far that the opening remains as large as possible. With the Communication Flux Model, the middle represents complete unfettered information flow. The left represents control hindered by the government. The right represents control hindered by other factors, namely corporations or fear of religious fanaticism. No society sits in the direct center of the Communication Flux Spectrum, nor does the model imply that an ideal society would sit in the center. See Figure 1 for an example of the model.
Figure 1: Communication Flux Spectrum
Heavy government Moderate government Corporate Fanaticism Fear
The spectrum is split up broadly into four categories that represent the type of control most prevalent in those media systems: Heavy government control, Moderate government control, corporate control, and religious control. But, more important than the broad category is the country’s placement on the flux spectrum. See figure 2 for an example of how individual nations fit on the Communication Flux Model:
Figure 2: Communication Flux Spectrum with nation examples
Heavy government Moderate government Corporate Fanaticism Fear
China Egypt United States Great Britain
According to the figure, China exists under the heavy government control. But, its placement to far from the left spectrum indicates that some free information does flow through the country’s media system. In contrast, North Korea – a country with no privately owned media – would sit at the far left end of the spectrum. According to observers, some criticism of the government is permitted as long as it’s carefully written. Also, the explosion of privately owned media is creating the larval stages of a free press. Cell phones have also been used to organize social protests in the country, a sign of more open communication. These factors move China toward the center of the flux spectrum. But, the government still controls enough of the information to leave the country in the heavy government category. The ability for the model to differentiate between the communication flux in China versus North Korea points to its superiority in comparison to the Four Theories Model.
Egypt, while still in the grips of a strong-handed government, sits to the right of China in the moderate government-control space. The Egyptian government regulates the media mostly privately-owned media through licenses and prosecution of material critical of the government. However, the country does allow some latitude for criticism, particularly online outlets. Efforts to impose more censorship have been met with protest and some public discussion. To dismiss Egypt simply as an authoritarian media system wouldn’t accurately reflect the complicated system at play. Therefore, the Egypt sits in the moderate control category, but toward the limited flux side of the spectrum.
The United States sits on the other side of the communication flux spectrum. While the government does regulate some communication (broadcast airwaves, libel), the United States enjoy a virtually unparalleled level of freedom from government control. However, corporate forces do make an impact on the flow of information. Because news organizations are beholden to their advertisers and their own need to make a profit, communication from them can never be called “free.” For evidence of this tendency, some critics point to the firing of NBC reporter Peter Arnett after he made critical comments about the Iraq War in 2003. Also, television audiences reward sensational news reports and low-culture television entertainment with high viewing. Therefore, the flow of communication is hindered by the incessant need to appeal to the biggest audience, rather than simply airing the most-deserving programming. However, technological advances have recently helped mitigate the corporate control on the U.S. communication flow. Blogs and other non-traditional outlets have found great success offering people an alternative to the large, corporate run news outlets. For these reasons, the United States sits in the corporate category, but close to the free-flowing center of the flux spectrum. The category appears quite similar to the democratic-participation model of the press. It stands apart from the libertarian and social responsibility models, the usual labels applied to the U.S. media system.
Great Britain sits in the final category. While the United Kingdom enjoys a long history of free expression, its recent activity moves it into an area of decreased communication flow. Like many other Western countries, Britain is struggling to balance the promises of free expression along with the need to keep social harmony by not offending members of the Muslim faith. Recent developments pointing to a restriction of speech include the cancellation of a play that was to take place in a Muslim heaven and the excising of portions of the play “Tamburlaine” to remove scenes attacking Muhammad. None of the major news outlets in Great Britain chose to reprint the Danish cartoons depicting Mohammad that caused an uproar in 2006. And in 2009, the country refused entry to anti-Muslim Dutch filmmaker and lawmaker Geert Wilders. The decision received criticism from many observers, some of whom noted the trend in self-censorship over issues that would likely provoke violence from Islamic extremists. For these reasons, Great Britain sits toward the right edge of the spectrum where free flow of communication is more impeded. Although, the fatwa against Salmon Rushdie was instituted in 1989, no communication model appears to have addressed the resulting constriction of free speech that’s placed on a society that fears violence reaction to individual speech. In this regard, the Communication Flux Model stands apart from all previous theories.
The model does have some drawbacks. Determining where a nation sits in the spectrum is admittedly a rather subjective task. This rough model doesn’t provide the specificity required to help guide the determination of where media systems should sit on the flux spectrum. To develop the theory more fully a set of criteria should be established that would help guide placement. A checklist might include questions such as “Do any media oulets regularly criticize the government?,” “Have new technologies led to the formation of social protests?” or “Have the courts ever overruled a censor’s actions?” Establishing these criteria would help add validity to the model.
Another substantial drawback is the “Fanaticism Fear” category. First, the category sits on the opposite end of the spectrum from heavy government – effectively implying that fear of fanatic response squelches free speech as much as a totalitarian regime. Evidence doesn’t support that implication. In most cases where free speech is restricted due to fear of fanatical response, the decision is widely discussed and often ridiculed. Also, in some cases fear has prompted a certain action, but a later development negated the effect. For instance, in 2008 the American publisher Random House decided to drop the publication of a novel about the Prophet Mohammed. The company said it feared the book could “incite acts of violence,” clearly a decision to self-censor over fear of fanaticism. However, in Great Britain a smaller publishing house bought the rights to the book and later published it. The model requires a method to deal with such instances where communication eventually does flow freely. It should also be reorganized to show that fear of religious fanaticism doesn’t equate with totalitarian censorship.
Despite these drawbacks, the Communication Flux Model offers several benefits. It provides a way to classify media systems in a more accurate way than the Four Theories and other models. The model allows for subtle variations in the amount of free flow of information. Also, the model specifically addresses the reduced flow of communication caused by the fear of fanatical Muslims. The relatively new phenomenon (which first gained prominence during the Mohammad cartoon riots of 2006) should be cataloged by academics and studied for its effects on communication systems.
Works Cited
Anderson, John Ward. “Cartoons of Prophet Met With Outrage.” The Washington Post, January 31, 2006.
Honan, Edith. “Random House pulls novel on Islam, fears violence,” August 7, 2008. Reuters Wire Service Report. http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSN0736008820080807 (February 26, 2009).
Huang, Hung. “Censorship in Chinese Media.” New York Times blog post, September 25, 2008. http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/25/censorship-in-chinese-media/?scp=6&sq=
china%20censorship&st=cse (February 25, 2009).
Jenkins, Paul. “Russian journalism comes under fire.” BBC, July 2, 2004, sec. Europe. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3860299.stm (February 25, 2009).
Kishkovsky, Sophia. “Internet is the outlet against Russian censorship.” The International Herald Tribune, August 31, 2008. http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/08/31/technology/LOSHAK.php (February 25, 2009).
McKenzie, Robert. Comparing Media from Around the World. Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 2005.
“Self-censorship in the West, two decades after the fatwa against Salman Rushdie: Speech impediments.” The Economist, February 14, 2009. http://www.economist.com/world/
international/displayStory.cfm?story_id=13130069&source=features_box_main (February 25, 2009).
Shokry, Muhammad. “Analysis: Egyptian bloggers emerge as opposition voice.” BBC Monitoring World Media Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, January 9, 2008.
Siebert, Fred Seaton, Fredrick Seaton Siebert, Theodore Peterson, Theodore Bernard Peterson, Wilbur Lang Schramm, and Wilbur Schramm. Four Theories of the Press: The Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1963.
Simons, Marlise. “Dutch Filmmaker, an Islam Critic, Is Killed.” The New York Times, November 3, 2004, sec. International / Europe. http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/03/international/
europe/03dutch.html (February 25, 2009).
Teel, Leonard. “In the Know: Media, Government, and Citizens' Access to Information in China and the U.S.” Presented at the 69th World Media Forum, Atlanta, February 19, 2009. [Information collected from various speakers during educational forum.]
“The limits to free speech: Cartoon wars.” The Economist, February 9, 2006. http://www.economist.com
/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=5494602 (February 25, 2009).
Waterfield, Bruno, and John Bingham. “Dutch antiMuslim politician turned away from Britain at Heathrow .” Telegraph.co.uk, February 12, 2009. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
newstopics/politics/lawandorder/4603182/Dutch-anti-Muslim-politician-turned-away-from-Britain-at-Heathrow.html (February 25, 2009).
Monday, March 23, 2009
Tuesday, February 3, 2009
Zaller's "The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion"
John Zaller’s “The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion” is a fantastic addition to the literature on public opinion and the science of examining the motives for people’s views on public policy. When reading Zaller’s book, it’s easy to get tunnel vision and subscribe entirely to his views. While his calculations do provide great evidence for his model (although he does use some rather elaborate statistical gymnastics), his model should nonetheless be taken with a grain of salt since other research provides evidence for other factors at play in public opinion formation.
Zaller makes a couple of overarching points. First off, he re-affirms that communications from elites do have an impact on public opinion. This finding further distances audience studies away from Lazarsfeld’s two-step opinion flow model, a trend that started in the 60s. But, he also found that political awareness determined the impact of elite communication. In effect, more politically aware people tended to get their cues from partisan political elites than people who are basically inattentive.
Secondly, Zaller challenges the basic assumption that voters actually have true preferences on public policies. He presents a model in which individuals have conflicting views on specific issues and “winning” opinion really has more to do with what’s on your mind when being interviewed by a pollster. This revelation should create a pause for students of mass political opinion. Many other models do contain a biased assumption – that everyone thinks about politics as much as the average communications researcher. Zaller’s brings points out what should be the starting point for most public opinion research: Most people just don’t care that much about public policy.
Zaller creates the “Receive-Accept-Sample” model and then tests it using public opinion data from the Vietnam War. The model is broken down into four parts.
The Reception Axiom (A1) posits that “the greater a person’s level of cognitive engagement with an issue, the more likely he or she is to be exposed to and comprehend – in a word, to receive – political messages concerning that issue” (p. 42). In other words, more politically aware individuals will receive political communication better. Zaller notes that the axiom “indicates nothing about the sources of the political communications that shape mass opinion” (42). He therefore avoids directly examining some interesting questions about the role of selective exposure and personal deliberation on public opinion. But, the model still works since all he’s saying is that more attentive people receive communication better – regardless of the source.
The Resistance Axiom (A2) notes that “people tend to resist arguments that are incompatible with their political predispositions, but they do so only to the extent that they possess contextual information necessary to perceive a relationship between the message and their predispositions.” So, prior dispositions have a huge impact on whether new information actually produces a change in opinion. But people without prior dispositions (i.e., the uninformed) will tend uncritically accept any political communication. Zaller backs up this model with “a large body of theory and research concerning political persuasion” (p. 45). His thinking lines up with Converse (1964) who found that informed consumers of political communication tend to “constrain” their views depending on the cues of political elites.
The Accessibility Axiom (A3) states that “the more recently a consideration has been called to mind or thought about, the less time it takes to retrieve that consideration or related considerations from memory and bring them to the top of the head for use” (p. 48). In other words, the mind is like a bucket – what’s on top usually comes out first. So, this axiom also sends shivers down the hopeful students of political communication. Surely, we’re more complex than that? But, Zaller backs up this axiom with a wide body of psychological literature.
The Response Axiom (A4) finds that “individuals answer survey questions by averaging across the considerations that are immediately salient or accessible to them.” This axiom augments A3 in that things on the top of one’s head are probably the one’s that will affect an individual’s decision-making process. The axiom allows “different people to respond to issue questions on the basis of different considerations – one, for example, emphasizing ideological concerns, another gut-level likes and dislikes, and yet another self-interest” (p. 49). In this sense, Zaller’s model is far more nuanced than standard S-R models, which assume that everyone reacts to messages in the same way. (An interesting test of A3 and A4 would be to ask about views on euthanasia and correlating for viewing the film “Million Dollar Baby.” Would views change based on how recently they’ve seen the film?)
After explaining his model, Zaller uses the rest of the book to support it with statistical evidence. In Chapter 6, he finds that when elite discourse favors as given public policy in a one-sided manner, it produces a “mainstream pattern.” The most aware members of the public then subscribe to the consensus most strongly. When elite discourse divides along partisan lines, a polarization of the public inevitably follows. In Chapters 7 and 8, Zaller shows that changes in the relative intensity of opposing messages can also affect attitude change (with more intense messages having greater affect.)
I’ll focus the remainder of this paper on Chapter 9, “Two-sided information flows,” because I see some interesting parallels to both our research on global warming attitudes and the credibility of anonymous sources. In this chapter, Zaller examines how “public opinion can be understood as a response to the relative intensity and stability of opposing flows of liberal and conservative communications” (p. 186).
Zaller uses attitudes toward the Vietnam War as a foil to test his model. He picked the subject because of available data and the war’s shift in public support. In order gauge the coverage of the war, Zaller instructed a research assistant to undergo a content analysis of newspapers and newsmagazines of the era. He had the RA code each article as either “prowar” or “antiwar.” As a veteran content analyzer , I must take umbrage with his methods. Zaller doesn’t mention intercoder reliability, probably because he never tested for it – and I doubt it would have been extremely high. Such a rough estimation sounds more like a guess that an analysis. However, the rough analysis probably gauged the rough outline of Vietnam War coverage over the years acceptably. So, perhaps I shouldn’t quibble. But, it appears we often draw the line on rigorous research methods at different places. On another note, Zaller’s method to obtain a hawk-dove data set is brilliant. (He took data from 1988 survey that asked the question, then applied the results to the 1966 data using attitudes and opinions as an interloper.)
Zaller discovered that the pro- and anti-war message became more intense between 1964 and 1966. Initially, the pro-war message was more intense than the anti-war message, but that advantage disappeared by 1970. The RAS model predicts that the attitude of politically attuned liberals would shift first between 1964 and 1966 because they would be the only one paying attention to the anti-war messages. He found exactly that. Zaller summarizes: “Public attitudes on major issues change in response to changes in the relative intensities of competing streams of political communications, as filtered through the reception-acceptance process” (p. 190). He then goes on to show – via complicated statistical models – that people respond to survey questions on the basis of “whatever considerations are present in their minds and immediately accessible memory” (p. 190). In essence, he finds that message intensity affects people who are inattentive, supporting that part of the RAS model. Some of his data analysis didn’t produce statistical precision. He explains this away with various reasons, but I found myself again wondering about the moving yardstick of research methodology.
After reviewing his statistical results, Zaller sums up by arguing that his theory improves upon Converse in one way. Converse argues that ideology operates as a “constraint.” Zaller points out that if liberals were truly constrained by ideology, then they would’ve remained in support of the war – “as another case of post-World War II liberal internationalism” (p. 209). Since liberals changed their views on the war, Zaller concludes that they must’ve looked toward elite cues, rather than rely upon ideological constraints. The Vietnam War is a rare opportunity, he concludes, to watch a shift in the evolution of mass ideologies.
Exposure to global warming is probably equally restrained by ideology. Perhaps the conservatives holding out skepticism are listening more attentively to the anti-global warming message in a similar fashion. But, unlike the Vietnam War study, the mainstream sources are almost completely ignoring the skeptical elites. So, where are they getting their political communication? Somebody ought to do a study…
Zaller makes a couple of overarching points. First off, he re-affirms that communications from elites do have an impact on public opinion. This finding further distances audience studies away from Lazarsfeld’s two-step opinion flow model, a trend that started in the 60s. But, he also found that political awareness determined the impact of elite communication. In effect, more politically aware people tended to get their cues from partisan political elites than people who are basically inattentive.
Secondly, Zaller challenges the basic assumption that voters actually have true preferences on public policies. He presents a model in which individuals have conflicting views on specific issues and “winning” opinion really has more to do with what’s on your mind when being interviewed by a pollster. This revelation should create a pause for students of mass political opinion. Many other models do contain a biased assumption – that everyone thinks about politics as much as the average communications researcher. Zaller’s brings points out what should be the starting point for most public opinion research: Most people just don’t care that much about public policy.
Zaller creates the “Receive-Accept-Sample” model and then tests it using public opinion data from the Vietnam War. The model is broken down into four parts.
The Reception Axiom (A1) posits that “the greater a person’s level of cognitive engagement with an issue, the more likely he or she is to be exposed to and comprehend – in a word, to receive – political messages concerning that issue” (p. 42). In other words, more politically aware individuals will receive political communication better. Zaller notes that the axiom “indicates nothing about the sources of the political communications that shape mass opinion” (42). He therefore avoids directly examining some interesting questions about the role of selective exposure and personal deliberation on public opinion. But, the model still works since all he’s saying is that more attentive people receive communication better – regardless of the source.
The Resistance Axiom (A2) notes that “people tend to resist arguments that are incompatible with their political predispositions, but they do so only to the extent that they possess contextual information necessary to perceive a relationship between the message and their predispositions.” So, prior dispositions have a huge impact on whether new information actually produces a change in opinion. But people without prior dispositions (i.e., the uninformed) will tend uncritically accept any political communication. Zaller backs up this model with “a large body of theory and research concerning political persuasion” (p. 45). His thinking lines up with Converse (1964) who found that informed consumers of political communication tend to “constrain” their views depending on the cues of political elites.
The Accessibility Axiom (A3) states that “the more recently a consideration has been called to mind or thought about, the less time it takes to retrieve that consideration or related considerations from memory and bring them to the top of the head for use” (p. 48). In other words, the mind is like a bucket – what’s on top usually comes out first. So, this axiom also sends shivers down the hopeful students of political communication. Surely, we’re more complex than that? But, Zaller backs up this axiom with a wide body of psychological literature.
The Response Axiom (A4) finds that “individuals answer survey questions by averaging across the considerations that are immediately salient or accessible to them.” This axiom augments A3 in that things on the top of one’s head are probably the one’s that will affect an individual’s decision-making process. The axiom allows “different people to respond to issue questions on the basis of different considerations – one, for example, emphasizing ideological concerns, another gut-level likes and dislikes, and yet another self-interest” (p. 49). In this sense, Zaller’s model is far more nuanced than standard S-R models, which assume that everyone reacts to messages in the same way. (An interesting test of A3 and A4 would be to ask about views on euthanasia and correlating for viewing the film “Million Dollar Baby.” Would views change based on how recently they’ve seen the film?)
After explaining his model, Zaller uses the rest of the book to support it with statistical evidence. In Chapter 6, he finds that when elite discourse favors as given public policy in a one-sided manner, it produces a “mainstream pattern.” The most aware members of the public then subscribe to the consensus most strongly. When elite discourse divides along partisan lines, a polarization of the public inevitably follows. In Chapters 7 and 8, Zaller shows that changes in the relative intensity of opposing messages can also affect attitude change (with more intense messages having greater affect.)
I’ll focus the remainder of this paper on Chapter 9, “Two-sided information flows,” because I see some interesting parallels to both our research on global warming attitudes and the credibility of anonymous sources. In this chapter, Zaller examines how “public opinion can be understood as a response to the relative intensity and stability of opposing flows of liberal and conservative communications” (p. 186).
Zaller uses attitudes toward the Vietnam War as a foil to test his model. He picked the subject because of available data and the war’s shift in public support. In order gauge the coverage of the war, Zaller instructed a research assistant to undergo a content analysis of newspapers and newsmagazines of the era. He had the RA code each article as either “prowar” or “antiwar.” As a veteran content analyzer , I must take umbrage with his methods. Zaller doesn’t mention intercoder reliability, probably because he never tested for it – and I doubt it would have been extremely high. Such a rough estimation sounds more like a guess that an analysis. However, the rough analysis probably gauged the rough outline of Vietnam War coverage over the years acceptably. So, perhaps I shouldn’t quibble. But, it appears we often draw the line on rigorous research methods at different places. On another note, Zaller’s method to obtain a hawk-dove data set is brilliant. (He took data from 1988 survey that asked the question, then applied the results to the 1966 data using attitudes and opinions as an interloper.)
Zaller discovered that the pro- and anti-war message became more intense between 1964 and 1966. Initially, the pro-war message was more intense than the anti-war message, but that advantage disappeared by 1970. The RAS model predicts that the attitude of politically attuned liberals would shift first between 1964 and 1966 because they would be the only one paying attention to the anti-war messages. He found exactly that. Zaller summarizes: “Public attitudes on major issues change in response to changes in the relative intensities of competing streams of political communications, as filtered through the reception-acceptance process” (p. 190). He then goes on to show – via complicated statistical models – that people respond to survey questions on the basis of “whatever considerations are present in their minds and immediately accessible memory” (p. 190). In essence, he finds that message intensity affects people who are inattentive, supporting that part of the RAS model. Some of his data analysis didn’t produce statistical precision. He explains this away with various reasons, but I found myself again wondering about the moving yardstick of research methodology.
After reviewing his statistical results, Zaller sums up by arguing that his theory improves upon Converse in one way. Converse argues that ideology operates as a “constraint.” Zaller points out that if liberals were truly constrained by ideology, then they would’ve remained in support of the war – “as another case of post-World War II liberal internationalism” (p. 209). Since liberals changed their views on the war, Zaller concludes that they must’ve looked toward elite cues, rather than rely upon ideological constraints. The Vietnam War is a rare opportunity, he concludes, to watch a shift in the evolution of mass ideologies.
Exposure to global warming is probably equally restrained by ideology. Perhaps the conservatives holding out skepticism are listening more attentively to the anti-global warming message in a similar fashion. But, unlike the Vietnam War study, the mainstream sources are almost completely ignoring the skeptical elites. So, where are they getting their political communication? Somebody ought to do a study…
"Public Opinion" -- Glynn, Herbst, O’Keefe, and Shapiro
Chapter Four of “Public Opinion” by Glynn, Herbst, O’Keefe, and Shapiro offers a great summation of psychological perspectives on the formation of public opinion. The chapter helpfully starts with an overview of the common definitions, including an explanation of the terms “beliefs,” “values,” “attitudes,” and “opinions.”
Beliefs, we are told, are the “cognitive components that make up our understanding of the way things are, that is, the information that individuals have about objects or actions.” They are the building blocks of opinions and attitudes. Often they are widely shared by an entire culture, so beliefs are tough to identify. For instance, Western culture embraces the belief that people are perfectible, that they can improve over time. Individuals in this culture, therefore, find it hard to understand the Indian caste system, in which members cannot rise above their current social status. When shaping public opinion, beliefs must be categorized as the most difficult attribute to influence. Even as an “objective academic,” I struggle to retain neutrality with certain beliefs. For instance, I believe strongly that free speech should always be favored in any battle against speech restriction. While I can defend that belief with evidence (e.g., marketplace of ideas, Milton’s “Areopagitica”) others can defend their opposing beliefs just as easily (e.g., harmony of the state, Hobbes’ “Leviathan.”) Beliefs are simply a representation of that which we assume to be true – a faith, for lack of a better word. Another trait of beliefs (not in the reading) is that people seldom admit that their beliefs are actually beliefs. Instead, they’ll argue that their beliefs are facts – the only possible interpretation of the evidence as laid out. By the way, many academic theorists – while professing to be full of free-thinking, evidence-based argumentation – suffer the worst from the assumption that they’ve found Truth by examining all the facts. Of course, that’s just my belief. (As another aside, I don’t think there’s a difference between a belief and “faith” – although the latter is often a dirty word.)
The authors go on to talk about values, described as representations “of the way things should be.” Values, then, are the goals one strives to obtain in whatever belief-system one operates. The authors then differentiate between two types of values. Terminal values are goals we want to reach (e.g., freedom, equality, peace.) Instrumental values are the means we endorse to reach our goals (e.g., honesty, responsibility, and loyalty.) Values are often, like beliefs, taken for granted.
Attitudes, we are told, “are general and enduring positive or negative feelings about some person, object or issue.” Attitudes have three components: cognitions (or beliefs), affect (or feelings) and behavior. The authors note that attitudes differ from beliefs because they have a strong emotional component. Of course, beliefs carry strong emotional components as well – try explain to a libertarian why rent-control is such a good idea. Indeed, finding the difference between beliefs and attitudes seems fraught with difficulty. The book explains that beliefs are evaluative in nature, but that you “perceive these evaluations as inherent characteristics of the objects of your beliefs.” But, attitudes reflect personal likes and dislikes, “you recognize them as your own orientation toward objects rather than as characteristics that are somehow part of the objects themselves.” Ahh! This makes sense. As I said earlier, beliefs tend to be viewed internally as incontrovertible conclusions brought out by an honest assessment of the facts. But, attitudes people are more likely to understand as simply “their way of looking at things.” This distinction would seem to be an incredibly important point for anyone interested in swaying public opinion. Since attitudes are cognitively conceived as a “personal preference,” they should be more malleable than beliefs, which are representations of Truth. Anyone interested in swaying public opinion, therefore, should first frame the issue as a matter of attitude, not a belief. In fact, views toward homosexuality (at least in the United States) have followed this model. Forty years ago most people shared the belief that homosexuality was wrong. Over the years, people’s feelings about the issue (well, at least some people’s) have softened with most just holding a residual attitude about it – nothing as solid as a belief. Many other social issues have followed a similar path (e.g., civil rights, smoking, corporal punishment, etc.)
That leaves us with opinions. The authors define these as the expression of an attitude “either verbally or through behavior.” The distinction between attitudes and opinions is that attitudes may never be expressed as opinions – “they are deeper inside a person than opinions are.” Attitudes are unwavering, but opinions can change along with circumstances. I love chocolate, but I may hate it after eating too much chocolate cake. Often attitudes and opinions jibe, but sometimes they do not. The book notes some people may believe members of Congress are disreputable but put a lot of faith in their own lawmaker. This tendency is an interesting example and one that I discovered in my lit review of media credibility. Many respondents distrusted the media in general, but gave high marks to their preferred media outlet.
The authors then discuss theories surrounding attitude formation. The earliest research found evidence of conditioning. In classical conditioning, people formed attitudes or beliefs, much like animals, based on cues from their surroundings. In operant conditioning, people act to maximize the positive and minimize the negative consequences of their behavior. For instance, a researcher found he could shape vocal patterns by merely offering positive or negative cues. Although later problems with the behavioral approach have arisen, the authors stress its most important contribution: That people do not think very much about the opinions they express. Probably the understatement of the year.
The authors do list at least five problems with the behavioral approach. The model doesn’t account for why some opinions are more thought-out than others. The model doesn’t account for a “package” of attitudes and opinions, and its impact on belief formation. The model doesn’t take into account that two people may hold the same belief for two different reasons. (Polls of Obama voters should support this tendency well.) Behavioral theories can’t explain why people don’t always act in concordance with their attitudes. Also, they don’t factor in emotions, which play an important role in formulation of public opinion.
So, what theories work better? Well, we have a bunch of choices. Consistency theories basically focus on the differences between different viewpoints (i.e., attitudes, opinions beliefs, etc.) These theories include balance theory (people want to create a balance in their thinking), congruity theory (weighing things with shades of gray) and cognitive dissonance theory (people tune out information that don’t correspond to their own beliefs.)
Judgmental theories argue that “our past experiences play an important role in the ways that we interpret new information.” These theories go beyond the simple Stimulus-Response models and look for more interactions that influence opinion formation. These include social judgment theory and adaption theory which both hold that individual situations play a part in shaping one’s views.
The cognitive mediation theory that we’re using in our global warming paper fits into the judgmental theory category. Grounded in the O-S-O-R model, it looks at Stimulus (S) and Response (R), but also examines those two O’s. The first is structural, cultural, cognitive and motivational characteristics of the audience (i.e., individual baggage). The second O exams what is likely to happen between the reception of the message and the response of the audience member. The cognitive model suggests that motivations do not have a direct role on media effects. Rather, the model predicts that motivations activate information processing behaviors that then lead to cognitive media effects. In sum, “the cognitive mediating model argues that information processing mediates the influence of gratifications sought on media effects.” If I understand that correctly, the authors are stating that prior attitudes will merely influence how we think about new information presented to us – not directly affect our decisions.
Beliefs, we are told, are the “cognitive components that make up our understanding of the way things are, that is, the information that individuals have about objects or actions.” They are the building blocks of opinions and attitudes. Often they are widely shared by an entire culture, so beliefs are tough to identify. For instance, Western culture embraces the belief that people are perfectible, that they can improve over time. Individuals in this culture, therefore, find it hard to understand the Indian caste system, in which members cannot rise above their current social status. When shaping public opinion, beliefs must be categorized as the most difficult attribute to influence. Even as an “objective academic,” I struggle to retain neutrality with certain beliefs. For instance, I believe strongly that free speech should always be favored in any battle against speech restriction. While I can defend that belief with evidence (e.g., marketplace of ideas, Milton’s “Areopagitica”) others can defend their opposing beliefs just as easily (e.g., harmony of the state, Hobbes’ “Leviathan.”) Beliefs are simply a representation of that which we assume to be true – a faith, for lack of a better word. Another trait of beliefs (not in the reading) is that people seldom admit that their beliefs are actually beliefs. Instead, they’ll argue that their beliefs are facts – the only possible interpretation of the evidence as laid out. By the way, many academic theorists – while professing to be full of free-thinking, evidence-based argumentation – suffer the worst from the assumption that they’ve found Truth by examining all the facts. Of course, that’s just my belief. (As another aside, I don’t think there’s a difference between a belief and “faith” – although the latter is often a dirty word.)
The authors go on to talk about values, described as representations “of the way things should be.” Values, then, are the goals one strives to obtain in whatever belief-system one operates. The authors then differentiate between two types of values. Terminal values are goals we want to reach (e.g., freedom, equality, peace.) Instrumental values are the means we endorse to reach our goals (e.g., honesty, responsibility, and loyalty.) Values are often, like beliefs, taken for granted.
Attitudes, we are told, “are general and enduring positive or negative feelings about some person, object or issue.” Attitudes have three components: cognitions (or beliefs), affect (or feelings) and behavior. The authors note that attitudes differ from beliefs because they have a strong emotional component. Of course, beliefs carry strong emotional components as well – try explain to a libertarian why rent-control is such a good idea. Indeed, finding the difference between beliefs and attitudes seems fraught with difficulty. The book explains that beliefs are evaluative in nature, but that you “perceive these evaluations as inherent characteristics of the objects of your beliefs.” But, attitudes reflect personal likes and dislikes, “you recognize them as your own orientation toward objects rather than as characteristics that are somehow part of the objects themselves.” Ahh! This makes sense. As I said earlier, beliefs tend to be viewed internally as incontrovertible conclusions brought out by an honest assessment of the facts. But, attitudes people are more likely to understand as simply “their way of looking at things.” This distinction would seem to be an incredibly important point for anyone interested in swaying public opinion. Since attitudes are cognitively conceived as a “personal preference,” they should be more malleable than beliefs, which are representations of Truth. Anyone interested in swaying public opinion, therefore, should first frame the issue as a matter of attitude, not a belief. In fact, views toward homosexuality (at least in the United States) have followed this model. Forty years ago most people shared the belief that homosexuality was wrong. Over the years, people’s feelings about the issue (well, at least some people’s) have softened with most just holding a residual attitude about it – nothing as solid as a belief. Many other social issues have followed a similar path (e.g., civil rights, smoking, corporal punishment, etc.)
That leaves us with opinions. The authors define these as the expression of an attitude “either verbally or through behavior.” The distinction between attitudes and opinions is that attitudes may never be expressed as opinions – “they are deeper inside a person than opinions are.” Attitudes are unwavering, but opinions can change along with circumstances. I love chocolate, but I may hate it after eating too much chocolate cake. Often attitudes and opinions jibe, but sometimes they do not. The book notes some people may believe members of Congress are disreputable but put a lot of faith in their own lawmaker. This tendency is an interesting example and one that I discovered in my lit review of media credibility. Many respondents distrusted the media in general, but gave high marks to their preferred media outlet.
The authors then discuss theories surrounding attitude formation. The earliest research found evidence of conditioning. In classical conditioning, people formed attitudes or beliefs, much like animals, based on cues from their surroundings. In operant conditioning, people act to maximize the positive and minimize the negative consequences of their behavior. For instance, a researcher found he could shape vocal patterns by merely offering positive or negative cues. Although later problems with the behavioral approach have arisen, the authors stress its most important contribution: That people do not think very much about the opinions they express. Probably the understatement of the year.
The authors do list at least five problems with the behavioral approach. The model doesn’t account for why some opinions are more thought-out than others. The model doesn’t account for a “package” of attitudes and opinions, and its impact on belief formation. The model doesn’t take into account that two people may hold the same belief for two different reasons. (Polls of Obama voters should support this tendency well.) Behavioral theories can’t explain why people don’t always act in concordance with their attitudes. Also, they don’t factor in emotions, which play an important role in formulation of public opinion.
So, what theories work better? Well, we have a bunch of choices. Consistency theories basically focus on the differences between different viewpoints (i.e., attitudes, opinions beliefs, etc.) These theories include balance theory (people want to create a balance in their thinking), congruity theory (weighing things with shades of gray) and cognitive dissonance theory (people tune out information that don’t correspond to their own beliefs.)
Judgmental theories argue that “our past experiences play an important role in the ways that we interpret new information.” These theories go beyond the simple Stimulus-Response models and look for more interactions that influence opinion formation. These include social judgment theory and adaption theory which both hold that individual situations play a part in shaping one’s views.
The cognitive mediation theory that we’re using in our global warming paper fits into the judgmental theory category. Grounded in the O-S-O-R model, it looks at Stimulus (S) and Response (R), but also examines those two O’s. The first is structural, cultural, cognitive and motivational characteristics of the audience (i.e., individual baggage). The second O exams what is likely to happen between the reception of the message and the response of the audience member. The cognitive model suggests that motivations do not have a direct role on media effects. Rather, the model predicts that motivations activate information processing behaviors that then lead to cognitive media effects. In sum, “the cognitive mediating model argues that information processing mediates the influence of gratifications sought on media effects.” If I understand that correctly, the authors are stating that prior attitudes will merely influence how we think about new information presented to us – not directly affect our decisions.
Wednesday, October 22, 2008
"Manipulating Public Opinion" -- Edward Bernays
Henry: "Dear Kate, you and I cannot be confined within the weak list of a country's fashion: we are the makers of manners, Kate."
-- Henry V, Act V, Scene II
In "Manipulating Public Opinion," Bernays makes an eloquent case for public relations. He writes: "This is an age of mass production. In the mass production of materials a broad technique has been developed and applied to their distribution. In this age, too, there must be a technique for the mass distribution of ideas" (p. 971). He notes that before mass communication, public opinion was shaped by other outlets -- tribal chiefs, kinds, and religious leaders (p. 959). When viewed through this lens, the art of manipulating public opinion can be viewed as democratic, since anyone (who can sway the press) can now work to change public sentiment. Bernays also argues that propaganda (public relations by its original moniker) and education are very similar. The former is more overtly partisan while the latter proclaims objectivity -- "attempts to be disinterested" (p. 959). An objective observation shows that education is often propaganda as well -- indeed, schoolbooks are still the most influential form of mass communication.
Bernays insists that manipulating public opinion is actually teaching the public to "ask for what it really wants" and thereby teaching "the public how to safeguard itself against his own possible tyrannous aggressiveness" (p. 960). So, Bernays says we're not manipulating opinion, we're just helping people identify their true beliefs. The notion requires a rather large suspension of disbelief. Bernays argues that somehow making people adopt a position is somehow helping them exercise their own free will. One wonders if Bernays truly believed what he was saying. Of course, Bernays would hope that we not discount this view the public relations is fundamentally good. Perhaps, he's right. After all, public relations campaigns fail all the time. Perhaps because you can't get people to believe something that fundamentally disagrees with their core beliefs. Bernays offers a laundry list of PR success and none of them seem overtly disturbing to core beliefs -- anti-lynching, hat buying, margarine. But, one wonders how Bernays would have responded to the propaganda tactics used by the Nazis. Was hatred for the Jews something that the public really wanted? Perhaps this is the difference between a mass and a public -- a mass can be led astray away from their core beliefs (just like a mob) but a public will remain true to their values.
-- Henry V, Act V, Scene II
In "Manipulating Public Opinion," Bernays makes an eloquent case for public relations. He writes: "This is an age of mass production. In the mass production of materials a broad technique has been developed and applied to their distribution. In this age, too, there must be a technique for the mass distribution of ideas" (p. 971). He notes that before mass communication, public opinion was shaped by other outlets -- tribal chiefs, kinds, and religious leaders (p. 959). When viewed through this lens, the art of manipulating public opinion can be viewed as democratic, since anyone (who can sway the press) can now work to change public sentiment. Bernays also argues that propaganda (public relations by its original moniker) and education are very similar. The former is more overtly partisan while the latter proclaims objectivity -- "attempts to be disinterested" (p. 959). An objective observation shows that education is often propaganda as well -- indeed, schoolbooks are still the most influential form of mass communication.
Bernays insists that manipulating public opinion is actually teaching the public to "ask for what it really wants" and thereby teaching "the public how to safeguard itself against his own possible tyrannous aggressiveness" (p. 960). So, Bernays says we're not manipulating opinion, we're just helping people identify their true beliefs. The notion requires a rather large suspension of disbelief. Bernays argues that somehow making people adopt a position is somehow helping them exercise their own free will. One wonders if Bernays truly believed what he was saying. Of course, Bernays would hope that we not discount this view the public relations is fundamentally good. Perhaps, he's right. After all, public relations campaigns fail all the time. Perhaps because you can't get people to believe something that fundamentally disagrees with their core beliefs. Bernays offers a laundry list of PR success and none of them seem overtly disturbing to core beliefs -- anti-lynching, hat buying, margarine. But, one wonders how Bernays would have responded to the propaganda tactics used by the Nazis. Was hatred for the Jews something that the public really wanted? Perhaps this is the difference between a mass and a public -- a mass can be led astray away from their core beliefs (just like a mob) but a public will remain true to their values.
Is Dewey's Theory of the Public Realizable? No
Dewey holds that public come into existence when things get bad: “Indirect, extensive, enduring and serious consequences of conjoint and interacting behavior call a public into existence having a common interest in controlling these consequences”
p. 126
Dewey makes it clear that obstacles to good public discourse do exist:
Special interests
Powerful corporate capital
Numbing and distracting entertainment
General selfishness
Vagaries of public communication make effective public deliberation difficult.
But, he argues, we can overcome this with good communication:
"Without such communication the public will remain shadowy and formless … Till the Great Society is converted into a Great Community, the Public will remain in eclipse. Communication can alone create a great community." p. 142
According to Alejandro's summation (p. 169), the following conditions for emergence of the public:
1) Dissemination and application of scientific knowledge
2) "Communication of the results of social inquiry," which "is the same thing as the formation of public opinion." (31)
3) The organization of effective and organized inquiry." (32)
4) Record and communication, which "are indispensable to knowledge" (33)
-- Footnotes from Chapter 6 of Hermeneutics, Citizenship, and the Public Sphere, by Roberto Alejandro
Dewey makes the best argument against his public
Given these requirements, Dewey's own points at the beginning of his book work against the creation of a public.
Dewey states that "political facts are not outside human desire and judgment." (p. 6) So, how do we ascertain what facts we should follow?
Dewey argues that "the difference between facts which are what they are independent of human desire and endeavor and facts which are to some extent what they are because of human interest and purpose, and which alter with alteration in the latter, cannot be got rid of by any methodology."
Dewey suggests we "appeal to facts" and pay attention to the "distinction between facts which condition human activity and facts which are conditioned by human activity." If we ignore this difference "social science becomes "psuedo-science."
Well, how do we pay attention to the distinction, when the people paying attention are not "outside human desire and judgment."? In effect, positivism is easily dismissed because nobody can actually agree upon which facts they agree are truthful. And, if the public sphere begins with scientific knowledge and a dissemination of this knowledge, then the realization of the public sphere breaks down right there.
p. 126
Dewey makes it clear that obstacles to good public discourse do exist:
Special interests
Powerful corporate capital
Numbing and distracting entertainment
General selfishness
Vagaries of public communication make effective public deliberation difficult.
But, he argues, we can overcome this with good communication:
"Without such communication the public will remain shadowy and formless … Till the Great Society is converted into a Great Community, the Public will remain in eclipse. Communication can alone create a great community." p. 142
According to Alejandro's summation (p. 169), the following conditions for emergence of the public:
1) Dissemination and application of scientific knowledge
2) "Communication of the results of social inquiry," which "is the same thing as the formation of public opinion." (31)
3) The organization of effective and organized inquiry." (32)
4) Record and communication, which "are indispensable to knowledge" (33)
-- Footnotes from Chapter 6 of Hermeneutics, Citizenship, and the Public Sphere, by Roberto Alejandro
Dewey makes the best argument against his public
Given these requirements, Dewey's own points at the beginning of his book work against the creation of a public.
Dewey states that "political facts are not outside human desire and judgment." (p. 6) So, how do we ascertain what facts we should follow?
Dewey argues that "the difference between facts which are what they are independent of human desire and endeavor and facts which are to some extent what they are because of human interest and purpose, and which alter with alteration in the latter, cannot be got rid of by any methodology."
Dewey suggests we "appeal to facts" and pay attention to the "distinction between facts which condition human activity and facts which are conditioned by human activity." If we ignore this difference "social science becomes "psuedo-science."
Well, how do we pay attention to the distinction, when the people paying attention are not "outside human desire and judgment."? In effect, positivism is easily dismissed because nobody can actually agree upon which facts they agree are truthful. And, if the public sphere begins with scientific knowledge and a dissemination of this knowledge, then the realization of the public sphere breaks down right there.
"Public Opinion" -- Walter Lippman
Lippmann -- Public Opinion
Introduction
Lippman points out the obvious -- that nobody can make decisions based only on things their know empirically -- at some point, everyone must rely upon someone else's (friend, mass media, teacher) communication to make decisions
P. 16:
"This, then, will be the clue to our inquiry. We shall assume that what each man does is based not on direct and certain knowledge, but on pictures made by himself or given to him."
But everybody comes up with their own beliefs in a complicated fashion -- not just by what their told.
p. 17:
"The very fact that men theorize at all is proof that their psuedo-environments, their interior representations of the world, are a determining element in though, feeling and action."
"Public opinion deals with indirect, unseen, and puzzling facts, and there is nothing obvious about them."
So, don't think figuring out why people think what they think is easy -- it's not. Particularly with politics.
Wikipedia's Hermeneutics definition appears appropriate:
"Essentially, hermeneutics involves cultivating the ability to understand things from somebody else's point of view, and to appreciate the cultural and social forces that may have influenced their outlook."
Lippman was a little ahead of his time...
P. 18
"The world that we have to deal with politically is out of reach, out of sight and out of mind." -- so, we have to create our own images.
And it's impossible to create a real image of what's out of sight.
"Chief factors which limit their access to the facts": (p 18)
1) Artificial censorships
2) Limitations of social contact
3) Comparatively meager time available in each day for paying attention to public affairs
4) Distortion from compressing complicated events into shot messages
5) Difficulty in using simple words to express complicated world
6) Fear of facing facts that would threaten established routines
Interesting. But, must the public have access to all these facts to engage in rational-critical debate?
Perhaps a belief, based on previous experience, nullifies the need for specific knowledge of facts.
belief that corporations will always screw over the little guy
belief that free-market works best
belief that we live in a constructed reality
belief that higher taxes hurt job creation
Points out that socialists believe there "exists in the hearts of men a knowledge of the world beyond their reach." (p. 19) Is that true?
States flatly that we must drop the "intolerable and unworkable fiction that each of us must acquire a competent opinion about all public affairs." (p. 19). Is this true?
Yes, but that's not necessarily bad
I don't know anything about insuring a car either -- why must I? Everyone has different interests
NOT ELITISM
Elitism is thinking that you're the only one smart enough to make decisions about public affairs because the public are stupid.
Lipppman isn't saying that (according to my reading)
A more realistic view is that some people just don't care -- doesn't mean they couldn't do a great job if they did care.
We shouldn't confuse "interest in public affairs" with "competence in managing public affairs"
In the Phantom Public, here's a little more elitist: "The socialist scheme has at its root the mystical fallacy of democracy, that the people, all of them, are competent." (1925, p. 38)
But, still, he's just saying that some people don't pay enough attention to make their vote worthwhile. Is this elitism? (No.)
Concludes introduction by saying: "That public opinions must be organized for the press if they are to be sound, not by the press as is the case today."
Makes sense too -- he's just saying that journalists don't necessarily know the right way to look at things either
Obviously, you want to have competing interests shaping their opinions. Otherwise you'd just get propaganda.
Stereotypes
Makes the case that you can't not have stereotypes:
p. 60
"But there are uniformities sufficiently accurate, and the need of economizing attention is so inevitible that the abandonment of all stereotypes for a wholly innocent approach to experience would impoverish human life."
Great point -- right?
We do teach about high-context and low-context cultures in SPCH 1000 -- that's a stereotype.
But he points out that we must be careful: "What matters is the character of the sterotypes, and the gullibility with which we employ them."
How do we do that? Hermeneutics:
Don't assume that the world is "codified according to a code which we possess." Instead, understand the "each man is only a small part of the world, that his intelligence catches at best only phases and aspects of a coarse net of ideas, then, when we use our stereotypes, we tend to know that they are only stereotypes, to hold them lightly, to modify them gladly."
p. 60
Intelligence work
Wow! He predicted the creation of the CIA!
"The [State] Department should be able to call on its own intelligence bureau to assemble the facts in a way suited to the diplomatic problem up for decision. And these facts the diplomatic intelligence bureau would obtain from the central clearing house."
"The central agency would, thus, have in it the makings of a national university."
p. 246
Toward the end, he offers some viewpoints on the masses:
"You cannot take more political wisdom out of human beings than there is in them. And no reform, however sensational, is truly radical, which does not consciously provide a way of overcoming the subjectivism of human opinion based on the limitation of individual experience." P. 249
So, we've really got to make sure people don't just vote on what they think they know -- so, we must make sure we inform them correctly.
So that they do not "elaborate their prejudice instead of increasing their knowledge."
But, who gets to decide what they know?
He never really says, other than deciders must influence the press
I'm not sure he believes one entity must decide.
Marketplace of ideas, and whatnot.
The appeal to the public
States the obvious again:
"The amount of attention available is far too small for any scheme in which it was assumed that all the citizens of the nation would, after devoting themselves to the publications of all the intelligence bureaus, become alert, informed, and eager on the multitude of real questions that never do fit very well into any broad principle. I am not making that assumption." p.250
"The purpose, then, is not to burden every citizen with expert opinions on all questions, but to push that burden away from him towards the responsible administrator."
This is very different from: "The public are stupid"
Lippman understood the dangers of the press controlling the message:
"For the practice of appealing to the public on all sorts of intricate matters means almost always a desire to escape criticism from those who know by enlisting a large majority which has had no chance to know. The verdict is made to depend on who has the loudest or the most entrancing voice, the most skillful or the most brazen publicity man, the best access to the most space in the newspapers. For even when the editor is scrupulously fair to "the other side," fairness is not enough. There may be several other sides, unmentioned by any of the organized, financed and active partisans."
Seems reasonable.
"The private citizen, beset by partisan appeals for the loan of his Public Opinion, will soon see, perhaps, that these appeals are not a compliment to his intelligence, but an imposition on his good nature and an insult to his sense of evidence."
Calls for experts to hash things out:
"That can be done by having the representative inside carry on discussion in the presence of some one, chairman or mediator, who forces the discussion to deal with the analyses supplied by experts. This is the essential organization of any representative body dealing with distant matters. The partisan voices should be there, but the partisans should find themselves confronted with men, not personally involved, who control enough facts and have the dialectical skill to sort out what is real perception from what is stereotype, pattern and elaboration..."
"The value of expert mediation is not that it sets up opinion to coerce the partisans, but that it disintegrates partisanship." p. 253
Expert mediation didn't really settle the case of Bush v. Gore, though.
Conservatives thought it was great; liberals decried it -- no partisanship disintegration
So, Lippman's got a great message up to a point -- but he loses me on the "experts make the decisions" -- are the public to simply let the experts figure out everything and never question anything? Seems untenable.
Agrees with Dewey, says that "education is the supreme remedy, the value of this education will depend upon the evolution of knowledge. And our knowledge of human institutions is still extraordinarily meager and impressionistic."
But, just because we're educated, doesn't mean will can interpret facts correctly.
Suggests teaching critical thought:
"What he can do is to prepare them to deal with that world with a great deal more sophistication about their own minds. He can, by the use of the case method, teach the pupil the habit of examining the sources of his information."
Do we teach this now?
I don't think so; I think we teach that there's one correct way to look at the world.
Introduction
Lippman points out the obvious -- that nobody can make decisions based only on things their know empirically -- at some point, everyone must rely upon someone else's (friend, mass media, teacher) communication to make decisions
P. 16:
"This, then, will be the clue to our inquiry. We shall assume that what each man does is based not on direct and certain knowledge, but on pictures made by himself or given to him."
But everybody comes up with their own beliefs in a complicated fashion -- not just by what their told.
p. 17:
"The very fact that men theorize at all is proof that their psuedo-environments, their interior representations of the world, are a determining element in though, feeling and action."
"Public opinion deals with indirect, unseen, and puzzling facts, and there is nothing obvious about them."
So, don't think figuring out why people think what they think is easy -- it's not. Particularly with politics.
Wikipedia's Hermeneutics definition appears appropriate:
"Essentially, hermeneutics involves cultivating the ability to understand things from somebody else's point of view, and to appreciate the cultural and social forces that may have influenced their outlook."
Lippman was a little ahead of his time...
P. 18
"The world that we have to deal with politically is out of reach, out of sight and out of mind." -- so, we have to create our own images.
And it's impossible to create a real image of what's out of sight.
"Chief factors which limit their access to the facts": (p 18)
1) Artificial censorships
2) Limitations of social contact
3) Comparatively meager time available in each day for paying attention to public affairs
4) Distortion from compressing complicated events into shot messages
5) Difficulty in using simple words to express complicated world
6) Fear of facing facts that would threaten established routines
Interesting. But, must the public have access to all these facts to engage in rational-critical debate?
Perhaps a belief, based on previous experience, nullifies the need for specific knowledge of facts.
belief that corporations will always screw over the little guy
belief that free-market works best
belief that we live in a constructed reality
belief that higher taxes hurt job creation
Points out that socialists believe there "exists in the hearts of men a knowledge of the world beyond their reach." (p. 19) Is that true?
States flatly that we must drop the "intolerable and unworkable fiction that each of us must acquire a competent opinion about all public affairs." (p. 19). Is this true?
Yes, but that's not necessarily bad
I don't know anything about insuring a car either -- why must I? Everyone has different interests
NOT ELITISM
Elitism is thinking that you're the only one smart enough to make decisions about public affairs because the public are stupid.
Lipppman isn't saying that (according to my reading)
A more realistic view is that some people just don't care -- doesn't mean they couldn't do a great job if they did care.
We shouldn't confuse "interest in public affairs" with "competence in managing public affairs"
In the Phantom Public, here's a little more elitist: "The socialist scheme has at its root the mystical fallacy of democracy, that the people, all of them, are competent." (1925, p. 38)
But, still, he's just saying that some people don't pay enough attention to make their vote worthwhile. Is this elitism? (No.)
Concludes introduction by saying: "That public opinions must be organized for the press if they are to be sound, not by the press as is the case today."
Makes sense too -- he's just saying that journalists don't necessarily know the right way to look at things either
Obviously, you want to have competing interests shaping their opinions. Otherwise you'd just get propaganda.
Stereotypes
Makes the case that you can't not have stereotypes:
p. 60
"But there are uniformities sufficiently accurate, and the need of economizing attention is so inevitible that the abandonment of all stereotypes for a wholly innocent approach to experience would impoverish human life."
Great point -- right?
We do teach about high-context and low-context cultures in SPCH 1000 -- that's a stereotype.
But he points out that we must be careful: "What matters is the character of the sterotypes, and the gullibility with which we employ them."
How do we do that? Hermeneutics:
Don't assume that the world is "codified according to a code which we possess." Instead, understand the "each man is only a small part of the world, that his intelligence catches at best only phases and aspects of a coarse net of ideas, then, when we use our stereotypes, we tend to know that they are only stereotypes, to hold them lightly, to modify them gladly."
p. 60
Intelligence work
Wow! He predicted the creation of the CIA!
"The [State] Department should be able to call on its own intelligence bureau to assemble the facts in a way suited to the diplomatic problem up for decision. And these facts the diplomatic intelligence bureau would obtain from the central clearing house."
"The central agency would, thus, have in it the makings of a national university."
p. 246
Toward the end, he offers some viewpoints on the masses:
"You cannot take more political wisdom out of human beings than there is in them. And no reform, however sensational, is truly radical, which does not consciously provide a way of overcoming the subjectivism of human opinion based on the limitation of individual experience." P. 249
So, we've really got to make sure people don't just vote on what they think they know -- so, we must make sure we inform them correctly.
So that they do not "elaborate their prejudice instead of increasing their knowledge."
But, who gets to decide what they know?
He never really says, other than deciders must influence the press
I'm not sure he believes one entity must decide.
Marketplace of ideas, and whatnot.
The appeal to the public
States the obvious again:
"The amount of attention available is far too small for any scheme in which it was assumed that all the citizens of the nation would, after devoting themselves to the publications of all the intelligence bureaus, become alert, informed, and eager on the multitude of real questions that never do fit very well into any broad principle. I am not making that assumption." p.250
"The purpose, then, is not to burden every citizen with expert opinions on all questions, but to push that burden away from him towards the responsible administrator."
This is very different from: "The public are stupid"
Lippman understood the dangers of the press controlling the message:
"For the practice of appealing to the public on all sorts of intricate matters means almost always a desire to escape criticism from those who know by enlisting a large majority which has had no chance to know. The verdict is made to depend on who has the loudest or the most entrancing voice, the most skillful or the most brazen publicity man, the best access to the most space in the newspapers. For even when the editor is scrupulously fair to "the other side," fairness is not enough. There may be several other sides, unmentioned by any of the organized, financed and active partisans."
Seems reasonable.
"The private citizen, beset by partisan appeals for the loan of his Public Opinion, will soon see, perhaps, that these appeals are not a compliment to his intelligence, but an imposition on his good nature and an insult to his sense of evidence."
Calls for experts to hash things out:
"That can be done by having the representative inside carry on discussion in the presence of some one, chairman or mediator, who forces the discussion to deal with the analyses supplied by experts. This is the essential organization of any representative body dealing with distant matters. The partisan voices should be there, but the partisans should find themselves confronted with men, not personally involved, who control enough facts and have the dialectical skill to sort out what is real perception from what is stereotype, pattern and elaboration..."
"The value of expert mediation is not that it sets up opinion to coerce the partisans, but that it disintegrates partisanship." p. 253
Expert mediation didn't really settle the case of Bush v. Gore, though.
Conservatives thought it was great; liberals decried it -- no partisanship disintegration
So, Lippman's got a great message up to a point -- but he loses me on the "experts make the decisions" -- are the public to simply let the experts figure out everything and never question anything? Seems untenable.
Agrees with Dewey, says that "education is the supreme remedy, the value of this education will depend upon the evolution of knowledge. And our knowledge of human institutions is still extraordinarily meager and impressionistic."
But, just because we're educated, doesn't mean will can interpret facts correctly.
Suggests teaching critical thought:
"What he can do is to prepare them to deal with that world with a great deal more sophistication about their own minds. He can, by the use of the case method, teach the pupil the habit of examining the sources of his information."
Do we teach this now?
I don't think so; I think we teach that there's one correct way to look at the world.
Thinking about Mass Publics
What are the theoretical, ethical, aesthetical and political challenges associated with mass publics?
Theoretically -- How exactly does one define a mass public, as opposed to a public? It appears that these authors refer to a mass public as a group that's easily swayed by mass media. Publics -- as conceptualized by previous authors -- are groups that engage in critical-rational debate. Of course, publics must get their information from some source, but if it's not the mass media, then it must be all right. The concept of "mass public" looks a lot like the hypdermic needle theory -- the mass public will believe whatever they're told by the mass media. Of course, this theory breaks down on many levels. Most dismiss it because of the rise of Lazarfeld's limited effects theory, but those theorists have come under fire as well. Perhaps, the real reason publics don't really act as mass publics (swayed at the whim of the mass media) is because publics have so many media choices and other opinion leaders. And, at the end of the day they take what propaganda was fed to them -- from various sources -- and make up their own minds.
Ethically -- Bernays insists that manipulating public opinion is actually teaching the public to "ask for what it really wants" and thereby teaching "the public how to safeguard itself against his own possible tyrannous aggressiveness" (p. 960). So, Bernays says we're not manipulating opinion, we're just helping people identify their true beliefs. The notion requires a rather large suspension of disbelief. Bernays argues that making people adopt a certain position is somehow helping them exercise their own free will -- an interesting ethical position. One wonders if Bernays truly believed what he was saying. Of course, Bernays would hope that we not discount this (manufactured?) view the public relations is fundamentally good. Perhaps, he's right. After all, public relations campaigns fail all the time, perhaps because you can't get people to believe something that fundamentally disagrees with their core beliefs. Bernays offers a laundry list of PR success and none of them seem overtly disturbing to core beliefs -- anti-lynching, hat buying, margarine. But, one wonders how Bernays would have responded to the successful propaganda tactics used by the Nazis. Was hatred for the Jews something that the public really wanted? Perhaps this is the difference between a mass and a public -- a mass can be led astray away from their core beliefs (just like a mob) but a public will remain true to their values.
On another ethical matter, Bernays makes a good point. Media leaders hold a great ability to shape public opinion. But, he points out that public opinion was once shaped by kings, tribal chiefs, and religious leaders. As Henry V said, "Dear Kate, you and I cannot be confined within the weak list of a country's fashion: we are the makers of manners, Kate" (Act V, Scene II.) When viewed through this lens, the art of manipulating public opinion can be viewed as democratic, since anyone (who can sway the press) can now work to change public sentiment. Is this ethically defensible?
Aethetically -- Dewey, Cooley and Park are all quite quite skeptical of new media and their effect on culture. None of them viewed film (the newest media at the time) as a cultural improvement. They may have simply been reflecting their times, many early films weren't adding much to their culture. Obviously, they have grown in stature as a truly independent form of art. All new media offer both a benefit and detriment to society. To embrace or dismiss them (radio, television, Internet, cell phones) wholly doesn't really make sense.
Politically -- Assuming that propaganda works to sway mass publics, we must ask how can governments work to make sure their people are swayed by the correct kind of propaganda. First, an acknowledgment that some propaganda is good. Many mass publics have been swayed by good PR -- e.g., civil rights, smoking, and seat belts. Also, an acknowledgment that public schools are the best forum for propaganda in the world. (Bernays says PR is overtly partisan while education "attempts to be disinterested" (p. 959).) But, how does an elected government determine what propaganda is the one which should sway the masses. For instance, some people blame the U.S. obesity epidemic in part on the USDA and their food pyramid that overstated the need for breads. Also, how can we tell what is fact-based propaganda vs. ideology-based propaganda. Who gets to decide? The IPA was criticized because their efforts at identifying propaganda seemed to contain political bias (p. 163). Only capitalists engage in propaganda, never communists or labor unions. Propaganda's easy to spot -- when the propagandist doesn't belong to your political party.
Interesting question: What do we make of Park and his almost theological bend toward sociology? Czitrom said the he treated it as a religion -- "defining unities and wholeness in the modern world" (p. 120) -- and could have easily gone into the seminary. Park's quote: "We have only to open our eyes to see organization; and if we cannot do that no definition will help us." Hmm.
Theoretically -- How exactly does one define a mass public, as opposed to a public? It appears that these authors refer to a mass public as a group that's easily swayed by mass media. Publics -- as conceptualized by previous authors -- are groups that engage in critical-rational debate. Of course, publics must get their information from some source, but if it's not the mass media, then it must be all right. The concept of "mass public" looks a lot like the hypdermic needle theory -- the mass public will believe whatever they're told by the mass media. Of course, this theory breaks down on many levels. Most dismiss it because of the rise of Lazarfeld's limited effects theory, but those theorists have come under fire as well. Perhaps, the real reason publics don't really act as mass publics (swayed at the whim of the mass media) is because publics have so many media choices and other opinion leaders. And, at the end of the day they take what propaganda was fed to them -- from various sources -- and make up their own minds.
Ethically -- Bernays insists that manipulating public opinion is actually teaching the public to "ask for what it really wants" and thereby teaching "the public how to safeguard itself against his own possible tyrannous aggressiveness" (p. 960). So, Bernays says we're not manipulating opinion, we're just helping people identify their true beliefs. The notion requires a rather large suspension of disbelief. Bernays argues that making people adopt a certain position is somehow helping them exercise their own free will -- an interesting ethical position. One wonders if Bernays truly believed what he was saying. Of course, Bernays would hope that we not discount this (manufactured?) view the public relations is fundamentally good. Perhaps, he's right. After all, public relations campaigns fail all the time, perhaps because you can't get people to believe something that fundamentally disagrees with their core beliefs. Bernays offers a laundry list of PR success and none of them seem overtly disturbing to core beliefs -- anti-lynching, hat buying, margarine. But, one wonders how Bernays would have responded to the successful propaganda tactics used by the Nazis. Was hatred for the Jews something that the public really wanted? Perhaps this is the difference between a mass and a public -- a mass can be led astray away from their core beliefs (just like a mob) but a public will remain true to their values.
On another ethical matter, Bernays makes a good point. Media leaders hold a great ability to shape public opinion. But, he points out that public opinion was once shaped by kings, tribal chiefs, and religious leaders. As Henry V said, "Dear Kate, you and I cannot be confined within the weak list of a country's fashion: we are the makers of manners, Kate" (Act V, Scene II.) When viewed through this lens, the art of manipulating public opinion can be viewed as democratic, since anyone (who can sway the press) can now work to change public sentiment. Is this ethically defensible?
Aethetically -- Dewey, Cooley and Park are all quite quite skeptical of new media and their effect on culture. None of them viewed film (the newest media at the time) as a cultural improvement. They may have simply been reflecting their times, many early films weren't adding much to their culture. Obviously, they have grown in stature as a truly independent form of art. All new media offer both a benefit and detriment to society. To embrace or dismiss them (radio, television, Internet, cell phones) wholly doesn't really make sense.
Politically -- Assuming that propaganda works to sway mass publics, we must ask how can governments work to make sure their people are swayed by the correct kind of propaganda. First, an acknowledgment that some propaganda is good. Many mass publics have been swayed by good PR -- e.g., civil rights, smoking, and seat belts. Also, an acknowledgment that public schools are the best forum for propaganda in the world. (Bernays says PR is overtly partisan while education "attempts to be disinterested" (p. 959).) But, how does an elected government determine what propaganda is the one which should sway the masses. For instance, some people blame the U.S. obesity epidemic in part on the USDA and their food pyramid that overstated the need for breads. Also, how can we tell what is fact-based propaganda vs. ideology-based propaganda. Who gets to decide? The IPA was criticized because their efforts at identifying propaganda seemed to contain political bias (p. 163). Only capitalists engage in propaganda, never communists or labor unions. Propaganda's easy to spot -- when the propagandist doesn't belong to your political party.
Interesting question: What do we make of Park and his almost theological bend toward sociology? Czitrom said the he treated it as a religion -- "defining unities and wholeness in the modern world" (p. 120) -- and could have easily gone into the seminary. Park's quote: "We have only to open our eyes to see organization; and if we cannot do that no definition will help us." Hmm.
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