"Public Opinion" -- Glynn, Herbst, O’Keefe, and Shapiro

Chapter Four of “Public Opinion” by Glynn, Herbst, O’Keefe, and Shapiro offers a great summation of psychological perspectives on the formation of public opinion. The chapter helpfully starts with an overview of the common definitions, including an explanation of the terms “beliefs,” “values,” “attitudes,” and “opinions.”
Beliefs, we are told, are the “cognitive components that make up our understanding of the way things are, that is, the information that individuals have about objects or actions.” They are the building blocks of opinions and attitudes. Often they are widely shared by an entire culture, so beliefs are tough to identify. For instance, Western culture embraces the belief that people are perfectible, that they can improve over time. Individuals in this culture, therefore, find it hard to understand the Indian caste system, in which members cannot rise above their current social status. When shaping public opinion, beliefs must be categorized as the most difficult attribute to influence. Even as an “objective academic,” I struggle to retain neutrality with certain beliefs. For instance, I believe strongly that free speech should always be favored in any battle against speech restriction. While I can defend that belief with evidence (e.g., marketplace of ideas, Milton’s “Areopagitica”) others can defend their opposing beliefs just as easily (e.g., harmony of the state, Hobbes’ “Leviathan.”) Beliefs are simply a representation of that which we assume to be true – a faith, for lack of a better word. Another trait of beliefs (not in the reading) is that people seldom admit that their beliefs are actually beliefs. Instead, they’ll argue that their beliefs are facts – the only possible interpretation of the evidence as laid out. By the way, many academic theorists – while professing to be full of free-thinking, evidence-based argumentation – suffer the worst from the assumption that they’ve found Truth by examining all the facts. Of course, that’s just my belief. (As another aside, I don’t think there’s a difference between a belief and “faith” – although the latter is often a dirty word.)

The authors go on to talk about values, described as representations “of the way things should be.” Values, then, are the goals one strives to obtain in whatever belief-system one operates. The authors then differentiate between two types of values. Terminal values are goals we want to reach (e.g., freedom, equality, peace.) Instrumental values are the means we endorse to reach our goals (e.g., honesty, responsibility, and loyalty.) Values are often, like beliefs, taken for granted.
Attitudes, we are told, “are general and enduring positive or negative feelings about some person, object or issue.” Attitudes have three components: cognitions (or beliefs), affect (or feelings) and behavior. The authors note that attitudes differ from beliefs because they have a strong emotional component. Of course, beliefs carry strong emotional components as well – try explain to a libertarian why rent-control is such a good idea. Indeed, finding the difference between beliefs and attitudes seems fraught with difficulty. The book explains that beliefs are evaluative in nature, but that you “perceive these evaluations as inherent characteristics of the objects of your beliefs.” But, attitudes reflect personal likes and dislikes, “you recognize them as your own orientation toward objects rather than as characteristics that are somehow part of the objects themselves.” Ahh! This makes sense. As I said earlier, beliefs tend to be viewed internally as incontrovertible conclusions brought out by an honest assessment of the facts. But, attitudes people are more likely to understand as simply “their way of looking at things.” This distinction would seem to be an incredibly important point for anyone interested in swaying public opinion. Since attitudes are cognitively conceived as a “personal preference,” they should be more malleable than beliefs, which are representations of Truth. Anyone interested in swaying public opinion, therefore, should first frame the issue as a matter of attitude, not a belief. In fact, views toward homosexuality (at least in the United States) have followed this model. Forty years ago most people shared the belief that homosexuality was wrong. Over the years, people’s feelings about the issue (well, at least some people’s) have softened with most just holding a residual attitude about it – nothing as solid as a belief. Many other social issues have followed a similar path (e.g., civil rights, smoking, corporal punishment, etc.)

That leaves us with opinions. The authors define these as the expression of an attitude “either verbally or through behavior.” The distinction between attitudes and opinions is that attitudes may never be expressed as opinions – “they are deeper inside a person than opinions are.” Attitudes are unwavering, but opinions can change along with circumstances. I love chocolate, but I may hate it after eating too much chocolate cake. Often attitudes and opinions jibe, but sometimes they do not. The book notes some people may believe members of Congress are disreputable but put a lot of faith in their own lawmaker. This tendency is an interesting example and one that I discovered in my lit review of media credibility. Many respondents distrusted the media in general, but gave high marks to their preferred media outlet.

The authors then discuss theories surrounding attitude formation. The earliest research found evidence of conditioning. In classical conditioning, people formed attitudes or beliefs, much like animals, based on cues from their surroundings. In operant conditioning, people act to maximize the positive and minimize the negative consequences of their behavior. For instance, a researcher found he could shape vocal patterns by merely offering positive or negative cues. Although later problems with the behavioral approach have arisen, the authors stress its most important contribution: That people do not think very much about the opinions they express. Probably the understatement of the year.

The authors do list at least five problems with the behavioral approach. The model doesn’t account for why some opinions are more thought-out than others. The model doesn’t account for a “package” of attitudes and opinions, and its impact on belief formation. The model doesn’t take into account that two people may hold the same belief for two different reasons. (Polls of Obama voters should support this tendency well.) Behavioral theories can’t explain why people don’t always act in concordance with their attitudes. Also, they don’t factor in emotions, which play an important role in formulation of public opinion.
So, what theories work better? Well, we have a bunch of choices. Consistency theories basically focus on the differences between different viewpoints (i.e., attitudes, opinions beliefs, etc.) These theories include balance theory (people want to create a balance in their thinking), congruity theory (weighing things with shades of gray) and cognitive dissonance theory (people tune out information that don’t correspond to their own beliefs.)

Judgmental theories argue that “our past experiences play an important role in the ways that we interpret new information.” These theories go beyond the simple Stimulus-Response models and look for more interactions that influence opinion formation. These include social judgment theory and adaption theory which both hold that individual situations play a part in shaping one’s views.
The cognitive mediation theory that we’re using in our global warming paper fits into the judgmental theory category. Grounded in the O-S-O-R model, it looks at Stimulus (S) and Response (R), but also examines those two O’s. The first is structural, cultural, cognitive and motivational characteristics of the audience (i.e., individual baggage). The second O exams what is likely to happen between the reception of the message and the response of the audience member. The cognitive model suggests that motivations do not have a direct role on media effects. Rather, the model predicts that motivations activate information processing behaviors that then lead to cognitive media effects. In sum, “the cognitive mediating model argues that information processing mediates the influence of gratifications sought on media effects.” If I understand that correctly, the authors are stating that prior attitudes will merely influence how we think about new information presented to us – not directly affect our decisions.